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TECHNOLOGICAL TRIGGERS TO TORT REVOLUTIONS:
STEAM LOCOMOTIVES, AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES, AND ACCIDENT COMPENSATION
11 J. Tort Law ___ (forthcoming 2018)
Donald G. Gifford*
Abstract: Waves of technological change explain the most important transformations of
American tort law. In this Article, I begin by examining historical instances of this linkage.
Following the Industrial Revolution, for example, machines, no longer humans and animals,
powered production. With greater force, locomotives and other machines inflicted far more
severe injuries. These dramatic technological changes prompted the replacement of the
preexisting strict liability tort standard with the negligence regime. Similarly, later technological
changes caused the enactment of workers’ compensation statutes, the implementation of
automobile no-fault systems in some states and routinized automobile settlement practices in
others that resemble a no-fault system, and the adoption of “strict” products liability. From this
history, I derive a model explaining how technological innovation alters (1) the frequency of
personal injuries, (2) the severity of such injuries, (3) the difficulty of proving claims, and (4) the
new technology’s social utility. These four factors together determine the choice among three
liability standards: strict liability, negligence, and no-fault liability with limited damages. I then
apply this model to the looming technological revolution in which autonomous vehicles, robots,
and other Artificial Intelligence machines will replace human decision-making as well as human
force. I conclude that the liability system governing autonomous vehicles is likely to be one
similar to the workers’ compensation system in which the victim is relieved of the requirement
of proving which party acted tortiously and caused the accident.
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Introduction
Originalists find themselves strangely out of place when it comes to tort law. The
personal injuries that dominate tort law, the smashing of bones by automobiles and other
powerful machines and the horrible diseases resulting from exposure to asbestos or lead-based
paint, did not exist in the late-eighteenth century. Not coincidentally, today’s law governing
compensation for personal injuries would be unrecognizable to the Founders. Moreover,
technological change has not ended. Instead, American society finds itself on the cusp of a
looming technological revolution, the Information Age, that will make autonomous vehicles,
robots, and other products incorporating artificial intelligence ubiquitous parts of everyday life.
In this Article, I trace how successive waves of technological change in American society
contributed to the development of law governing liability for personal injuries. Each new wave
of technology rips the fabric of the preexisting law governing compensation for accidental
personal injuries.1 From this history, I derive a descriptive model that analyzes how the
technological changes resulting from the Industrial Revolution, including the development and
proliferation of railroads, led to the installation of the negligence regime during the midnineteenth century.
In the first decades of the twenty-first century, a model that associates technological and
legal change is more than a matter of academic curiosity. It assists us in predicting the future of
the law governing personal injury claims arising from autonomous vehicles and other devices
where the machines themselves perform the decision-making, as well as supplying the force that
causes personal injuries.

Jack Balkin observes that “[i]nstead of saying that law is responding to essential features of new technology, it
might be better to say that social struggles over the use of new technology are being inserted into existing features of
law, disrupting expectations about how to categorize situations.” Jack M. Balkin, The Path of Robotics Law, 6
CALIF. L. REV. CIRCUIT 45, 50 (2015), http://www.californialawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/BalkinCircuit.pdf.
1
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Given that the staggering amounts of personal injuries in modern society that result
almost exclusively from machines and toxic substances that did not exist before the Industrial
Revolution, it is surprising that no other tort scholar or legal historian has comprehensively
tracked how changes in tort law flow from technological change.2 Other legal historians and tort
scholars, notably Morton Horwitz, Lawrence Friedman, and Gary Schwartz, have previously
considered the role of technological change during the nineteenth century, particularly the
emergence of railroads, as a possible cause of the development of negligence law.3 Even here,
however, their scholarly debate of a generation ago focused more on whether the changes in law
were intended to shift the distributional consequences of harms caused by new technologies, that
is, which socioeconomic class would bear the economic brunt of injuries, rather than on how
changes in technology, in and of themselves, precipitated changes in the law. Additionally, these
scholars left us without a comprehensive theory explaining the role played by technological
advancements in changing tort law. Other factors, including not only politics and ideology, but
also race, gender, and socioeconomic considerations, obviously affect the development of tort
law.4 However, because actionable tortious injuries almost always directly involve products of

2

A rich literature exists tracing the impact of technology on other aspects of tort law, such as invasion of privacy
torts. See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1805, 1819–21, 1826–28
(2010) (describing the origins of the invasion of privacy torts in the technologies of the late nineteenth-century and
advocating updates to the law to reflect modern website and database technology). Moreover, a few scholars have
begun to address the specific issues arising from the impact of robotics in causing physical injuries. See, e.g.,
Balkin, supra note 1, at 45–55 (considering the interaction between robotic technologies and the law); Ryan Calo,
Robotics and the Lessons of Cyberlaw, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 513, 515, 534–35 (2015) (“Robotics is shaping up to be
the next transformative technology of our time. … A transformative technology such as … robotics matters insofar
as it changes the range of human experiences in ways that undermine the balance the law hopes to strike”); Nora
Freeman Engstrom, 3-D Printing and Product Liability: Identifying the Obstacles, 162 U PA. L. REV. ONLINE 35, 36
(2013), http://www.pennlawreview.com/online/162-U-Pa-L-Rev-Online-35.pdf (analyzing the products liability
issues arising from 3-D printing and stating that “[f]ollowing any significant technological breakthrough, legal
scholars, practitioners, and policymakers must consider how the innovation meshes with—or poses challenges to—
our existing laws”).
3
See infra notes 148–172 and accompanying text.
4
See, e.g., MARTHA CHAMALLAS & JENNIFER B. WRIGGINS, THE MEASURE OF INJURY: RACE, GENDER, AND TORT
LAW (2010); Donald G. Gifford & Brian Jones, Keeping Cases from Black Juries: An Empirical Analysis of How
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technology, the lack of scholarly attention to the history of technology appears initially to be a
curious omission.
To understand why legal scholars avoid the history of technology and its impact on the
law, let us consider the broader scholarly realm, where the history of technology is similarly
decidedly out of vogue.5 Technological determinism, once the dominant perspective of the
history of technology, rested on the proposition that technological change was the cause of
socioeconomic and political transformation.6 This perspective often morphed into an elitist
celebration of Western civilization and its technological accomplishments.7 Leo Marx notes that
for many historians of technology, “[t]he West’s dominant belief system, in fact, turned on the
idea of technical innovation as a primary agent of progress.”8 This optimistic, Western-oriented
school of technological determinism, however, became decidedly unpopular during the latetwentieth century. Identifying human progress as technological progress could not survive
“Hiroshima, the nuclear arms race, the American war in Vietnam, Chernobyl, Bhopal, the Exxon
oil spill, acid rain, global warming, [and] ozone depletion.”9 Additionally, the study of history
(and the law) now more fully and accurately reflects the perspectives of those who had not fared

Race, Income Inequality and Regional History Affect Tort Law, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 557, 617–19 (2016)
(confirming, empirically, the effect of race on changes in tort law and evaluating the possible effects of income
inequality).
5
John M. Staudenmaier, Rationality versus Contingency in the History of Technology, in DOES TECHNOLOGY DRIVE
HISTORY?: THE DILEMMA OF TECHNOLOGICAL DETERMINISM 259, 260–61 (Merritt Roe Smith & Leo Marx, eds.,
1994) [hereinafter “DOES TECHNOLOGY DRIVE HISTORY?”] (observing that “the work of historians of technology is
so often ignored in the historical mainstream”; further noting the “total absence of historians of technology” from a
debate over the proper subjects of historical interpretation).
6
Historians variously find the genesis of technological determinism in the work of, among others, Thorstein Veblen,
see THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF BUSINESS ENTERPRISE 303 (Charles Scribner’s Sons 1932) (1904) (“The
factor in the modern situation that is alien to the ancient regime is the machine technology, with its many and wide
ramifications.”) and Karl Marx, see KARL MARX, THE POVERTY OF PHILOSOPHY 109 (Int’l Publishers Co., Inc.6th
prtg. 1975) (1847) (“The hand-mill gives you society with the feudal lord; the steam-mill, society with the industrial
capitalist.”).
7
See Studenmaier, supra note 5, at 271 (noting that the traditional school of historians of technology “might suggest
that the people who identify with Western, quantified, rational, scientific-technological progress reveal … an
[unblushing] elitism” … They might be saying “Face it: Western science, Western practice, Western economics
have in fact swept the opposition from the field, and the only people who really don’t get it are those who are
illiterate of the language of the past couple of hundred years”).
8
Leo Marx, The Idea of “Technology” and Postmodern Pessimism, in DOES TECHNOLOGY DRIVE HISTORY?, supra
note 5, at 240 (further stating that “between 1750 and 1850 … at more popular levels of culture, … progress … was
exemplified by innovations in the familiar practical arts.”).
9
Id. at 238.
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as well during the post-Enlightenment technological era, such as those living in both
underdeveloped countries and less affluent communities.10
Ironically, the flight from the study of technology as a cause of socioeconomic change
encompassed even ignoring technology’s role in causing unwanted and deleterious
consequences.11 This scholarly gap is particularly germane to the study of those aspects of tort
law governing compensation for personal injuries. Nineteenth-century technological changes
increased the severity of tortiously caused personal injuries. The force and momentum of
machines, such as locomotives, smashing into human bodies almost always inflicted far more
severe injuries than did the accidental harms previously caused by human beings themselves and,
in most instances, even the injuries inflicted by horses or other farm animals in an earlier era.12
It is not surprising that this first technological revolution resulted in the most important
transformation of tort law in American history.
Now, American society is in the midst of a similarly important set of technological
changes. Autonomous vehicles, often referred to as driverless cars, and other forms of robotics
controlled by artificial intelligence suggest that within a decade or less, much of the decisionmaking that results in personal injuries to others will be in the hands of machines, not humans.13
In the nineteenth century, machine force replaced human (and animal) force. Similarly, during
the early twenty-first century, the decisions controlling machines will shift from humans to the
machines themselves.
How will artificial intelligence and robotics change the tort law governing compensation
for personal injuries? How should the law governing autonomous vehicles and other machines
10

See Studenmaier, supra note 5 at 260 (noting the absence of technology as an appropriate topic of historical
interpretation from a list that focused instead on racial minorities, families, and urban populations).
11
But cf. Daniel Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U.L. REV. 61, 62 (2009) (noting that “[n]ew technologies
generate economic progress by reducing the costs of socially productive activities … [but] often reduce the costs of
socially destructive activities.”).
12
See infra notes 79–92, and accompanying text.
13
See infra notes 342–392, and accompanying text.
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directed by artificial intelligence be changed? Neither the descriptive nor the normative question
can be intelligently analyzed without an understanding of how and why American tort law
responded to technological change in the past.
Informed by the history of how new technological waves affected tort law in the past, in
this Article I present a simple descriptive model that suggests new technologies impact four
variables that in turn alter tort law:
(1) the frequency of personal injuries caused by the technology;
(2) the severity of injuries caused by the new technology;
(3) the level of difficulty in proving liability; and
(4) the social utility of the new technology.
My focus here, with one exception, is how technology induces changes in the formal,
articulated law of torts. I recognize that throughout the history of American tort law, novel
technologies sometimes caused swells of tortiously-caused harms that were resolved through
aggregate settlement procedures between “repeat players”14 who often applied rules of thumb to
both liability and damages issues that sometimes deviated from the formal, articulated rules of
torts.15 I do describe the single example of how the settlement of routine automobile accident
claims during recent decades, even in states that did not adopt formal no-fault systems, often
echoes such an approach by awarding damages to injured claimants despite the fact that the strict
application of the law of torts might suggest a different result and by valuing the damages
awarded in a formulaic manner.16 Further, the scope of this Article is limited to the substantive
issues of whether fault is required for liability and whether the claimant is able to recover the full
measure of common-law damages or instead if recoverable damages are limited to economic
losses or some portion thereof. I do not, for example, consider how new technologies led to

14

See infra note 266 and accompanying text.
See Samuel Issacharoff & John Fabian Witt, The Inevitability of Aggregate Settlement: An Institutional Account of
American Tort Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1571, 1588 (2004) (reporting that “such standardized claims practices …
tended to depart from what the formal law of torts might have provided in any individual case.”).
16
See infra notes 265–278, and accompanying text.
15
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innovative doctrines governing factual causation in mass product torts, such as market share
liability.17
In Part I, I briefly describe technology in pre-industrial America and analyze why claims
seeking compensation for personal injury were so rare even though most scholars conclude that
the prevailing standard of liability was one of strict liability. There are few records of accidental
injuries and claims for compensation, but what is known about technology and the law during
this era enables me to offer a credible explanation for what occurred.
In Part II, I turn my attention to the mid-nineteenth century, the time of both the
Industrial Revolution (especially the development of railroad networks), and the most dramatic
transformation in the history of American tort law: the change from the ex-ante strict liability
standard to the classical negligence regime. I examine the various competing explanations
previously offered by legal historians and scholars to explain the change in liability standards. I
conclude that technology in and of itself, rather than the class-based distributional consequences
identified by Morton Horwitz and Lawrence Friedman, lay at the heart of the critical
transformation from strict liability to negligence.18 Using the technology-caused factors
affecting liability standards previously identified, I find that the most important factors causing
the change were the increased aggregate liability facing railroads and other industries, caused
largely by the increased severity of injuries resulting from the proliferation of new machinery,
and the perceived social utility of new technologies. I also describe how other factors that legal
historians and scholars identify as alternative explanations for either the increase in the

17

See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Lab, 607 P.2d 924, 937 (Cal. 1980) (holding each DES-manufacturer liable for the
portion of damages equivalent to its share of the relevant market for its product when plaintiff is unable to identify
the particular defendant that manufactured the product causing her harm).
18
See infra notes 190-202, and accompanying text.
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frequency of claims19 or the emergence of the negligence regime20 are more accurately
interpreted as secondary consequences of technological change.
In Part III, I describe three sets of legal changes that I attribute to the “aftershocks” of the
Industrial Revolution. First, the proliferation of factories, which required the development of
both railroad networks and industrial machinery, played an important role in the enactment of
state workers’ compensation statutes.21 Second, the proliferation of automobiles and the
accidents they caused led to the formal adoption of no-fault compensation systems in a minority
of states and routinized claims processing that sometimes resembled a no-fault system in other
states.22 Third, mass production factories combined with modern transportation systems to yield
the mass consumer society, which, I argue, led in turn to the development of “strict” products
liability.23
Part IV briefly outlines a descriptive model derived from the previous history and
analysis, explaining the four variables that connect the technological advances to changes in
substantive tort law. These variables include the frequency of personal injuries caused by the
new wave of technology, the severity of those resulting injuries, the degree of difficulty victims
face in proving their claims, and the social utility of the technological advances. I then test the
model by applying it to past waves of technological change.
Part V looks to the future and anticipates the changes in accident compensation law likely
to result from the imminent technological revolution in which decision-making by machines will
control the force that causes personal injuries. I argue that technological advances, including

19

See infra notes 95–125, 187, and accompanying text.
See infra notes 173–189, and accompanying text.
21
See infra notes 207–230, and accompanying text.
22
See infra notes 231–278, and accompanying text.
23
See infra notes 279–330, and accompanying text.
20
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robotics, artificial intelligence, and particularly autonomous vehicles, will lead to the most
important changes in American tort law since those of the mid-nineteenth century.
I then briefly conclude.

I. Accidents and Claims in Pre-industrial America
Pre-industrial America was a different world. In this Part, I begin by describing the
paucity of significant accidental injuries that occurred in America before 1820.24 I then consider
why even when accidental injuries did occur, they seldom led to legal claims for compensation.25
Finally, in those rare instances in which a claim reached court, I argue that the meager evidence
suggests that the prevailing liability standard was one of strict liability.26
A. Personal Injury Accidents in Pre-Industrial America
Remarkably little is known about either accidental injuries in the United States before the
mid-nineteenth century or claims for compensation resulting from such injuries. In later eras, the
accidental harms that led to tort claims were most often caused by machinery.27 Carroll Pursell,
a leading scholar of the history of technology, describes the technology that Europeans brought
to the United States in the seventeenth century as “primarily a handicraft technology.”28 Pursell
notes that “[m]ost tools were hand tools … made of wood.”29 Well into the nineteenth century,
the economy was almost exclusively an agrarian one, and machines were “the traditional tools of
farming: the hoes, spades, scythes, reaping hooks, shovels, carts, harrows, and plows.”30 Human

24

See infra notes 27–34, and accompanying text.
See infra notes 35–54, and accompanying text.
26
See infra notes 55–64, and accompanying text.
27
See MANSEL G. BLACKFORD & K. AUSTIN KERR, BUSINESS ENTERPRISE IN AMERICAN HISTORY 99 (2d ed. 1990)
(observing that “industrialization changed the way goods were produced … . [M]achines … replaced handicraft
labor”).
28
CARROLL PURSELL, THE MACHINE IN AMERICA: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF AMERICA 10 (2d ed. 2007); see also
BLACKFORD & KERR, supra note 27, at 98 (reporting that “[b]efore the Industrial Revolution, men and women made
yarn and cloth at home, with simple, hand-powered machinery”).
29
PURSELL, supra note 28, at 10.
30
Id. at 14.
25
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beings provided both the force that operated the tools and the decision-making that directed their
use.
Accidental injuries no doubt occurred prior to the mid-nineteenth century, but we can
only speculate as to how often they occurred. No government agency or insurance actuary
contemporaneously compiled records of such accidents, but as any home-handyperson knows,
even simple manual tools such as hammers, sometimes cause injuries.31 The bulk of accidents
during the preindustrial era involved a single person and sometimes family members or close
friends.32 As such, these accidents were decidedly different than their twenty-first-century
analogs, which are perhaps best exemplified by random automobile accidents between strangers
commuting on a Los Angeles expressway.
The earliest American legal opinions involving claims for personal injuries, issued
between 1810 and 1840, describe a handful of examples of the subset of early accidental
personal injuries where someone other than the victim or a family member can plausibly be
asserted to have caused the accident. These accidents disproportionately involved injuries
arising from transportation, still the most common source of tortious injuries.33 The injuries

31

See Stephen D. Sugarman, Doing Away with Tort Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 555, 592–93 n.166 (1985) (noting that
most personal injuries occur in the household and do not result in filed claims).
32
See JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC: CRIPPLED WORKINGMEN, DESTITUTE WIDOWS, AND THE
REMAKING OF AMERICAN LAW 52–53 (2004) (reporting that “[d]uring the 1820s and 1830s, the shape of economic
life in the North underwent a critical shift … . New mills and factories … separated production from the sphere of
domestic life”); Kenneth S Abraham, The Common Law Prohibition on Party Testimony and the Development of
Tort Liability, 95 VA. L. REV. 489, 498 (2009) (noting that “parties involved in accidents on family farms would
typically have been close relatives, against whom suit would either have been economically pointless or barred by
intrafamily immunity rules.”); Gary T. Schwartz, Tort Law and the Economy in Nineteenth-Century America: A
Reinterpretation, 90 YALE L.J. 1717, 1734 (1981) [hereinafter Tort Law and the Economy] (observing that “[i]n
1790, … the vast majority of Americans lived and worked on family farms. In the urban towns, simple products
were fabricated by artisans”) (footnote omitted).
33
See THOMAS H. COHEN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 206240, TORT TRIALS AND VERDICTS IN LARGE COUNTIES
2001, at 2 tbl.1 (2004), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ttvlc01.pdf (showing that 53.3% of all tort trials in
2001 were automobile related; premises liability cases were a distant second at 16%). Morton Horwitz refers to
“collision cases” as “the first to involve joint actors.” MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN
LAW, 1780-1860, 88, 95–96 (1977). A random sampling of written legal opinions in cases involving accidental
personal injuries from this era includes injuries sustained by a stage-coach passenger when the negligent driver
overturned the coach, Stokes v. Saltonstall, 38 U.S. 181, 190 (1839) (affirming judgment of liability); Ware v. Gay,
(11 Pick.) 106, 112 (1831) (regarding personal injury caused by negligently maintained stagecoach); Lane v.
Crombie, 29 Mass. (12 Pick.) 177, 178 (1831) (regarding four-horse sleigh running over plaintiff); Ford v. Monroe,
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caused by these accidents, however, were likely distinguishable in important ways from those
occurring even a half-century later. First, while it is only possible to speculate about the
frequency of such accidental injuries, most were likely not as severe as injuries sustained in the
late nineteenth and the twentieth century. The force or power that propelled the objects that
impacted the victim’s body and inflicted these injuries were either human or animal. In either
event, they lacked the magnitude of force of the instrumentalities that would later inflict most
accidental injuries, such as coal-fired steam locomotives or gasoline-powered automobiles.
Second, the human beings that accidentally inflicted the injuries in most instances were probably
either the victim himself or family members or friends of the victim. They were not anonymous
employees of large industrial enterprises that had access to significant resources to pay for the
costs of the accidental injuries they had inflicted.34
B. The Paucity of Personal Injury Claims in Pre-Industrial America
Even when a victim experienced a personal injury of significant severity during the preindustrial period in the United States, it was unlikely that such injury would result in a legal
claim seeking compensation. Legal historian John Fabian Witt observes that “[e]ighteenthcentury lawyers and judges in England and in the American colonies paid little attention to the
problem of unintentional injury.”35 Several reasons explain this. First, as previously mentioned,
the injurer often was a family member or a close friend.36 Most often, such individuals did not
themselves possess the resources to make them attractive targets for claims seeking
compensation. Corporations and other large-scale commercial enterprises, the “target

20 Wend. 210, 211 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1837) (driving a gig negligently resulted in death of a child), and those sustained
by a driver when his horse and wagon fell through an opening of a bridge. See Shepherd v. Lincoln, 17 Wend. 250,
252 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1838) (affirming judgment of liability); cf. also, Hunt v. Pownal, 9 Vt. 411, 419 (1837) (holding
defendant town liable for insufficiently maintained road that caused wagon to overturn).
34
See infra notes 95–99, and accompanying text.
35
WITT, supra note 32, at 6.
36
See supra notes 32, 34, and accompanying text.
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defendants”37 of later times, were rare.38 Further, it was not until the late nineteenth century that
liability insurance became available in the United States.39 Indeed, liability insurance was
believed to be against public policy, because it contributed to moral hazard by freeing a
tortfeasor from the financial consequences of its tortious harms.40
The second reason that claims for personal injuries were rare was the witness
disqualification rule.41 Unbelievable as it may seem today, until the 1840s or later, the injured
plaintiff and any other witnesses with an interest in the outcome, such as husbands and wives,
were prohibited from testifying in court because of the witness disqualification rule.42
Obviously, this rule made it difficult or impossible for the plaintiff to find a witness to testify on
her behalf in simple collision or workplace injury cases.43 The rule often posed less of a
disadvantage to the defendant because in many cases the defendant was an entity such as a
stagecoach or other transportation company. In this situation, many states interpreted the rule to
allow the employees of the defendant to testify, even if the defendant itself would not have been
able to do so.44 Further, plaintiffs were unable to testify about the damages that they were

See Cornelius J. Peck, Washington’s Partial Rejection and Modification of the Common Law Rule of Joint and
Several Liability, 62 WASH. L. REV. 233, 238 (1987) (defining target defendants as tortfeasors selected as
defendants based on their “financial responsibility and ability to pay. . .”).
38
See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 129 (3d ed. 2005) (noting that most corporations in
the colonial period “were churches, charities, or cities or boroughs”).
39
See Kenneth S. Abraham, The Rise and Fall of Commercial Liability Insurance, 87 VA. L. REV. 85, 86 (2001)
(“Until the second half of the nineteenth century, liability insurance would have been considered against public
policy.”).
40
Id.
41
See Kenneth S. Abraham, supra note 32, at 490 (reporting that “between about 1600 and 1850, neither the
plaintiff nor the defendant in a tort suit could testify in that suit”); Kenneth S. Abraham & G. Edward White, The
Transformation of the Civil Trial and the Emergence of American Tort Law, 59 ARIZ. L. REV. 431, 448–52 (2017)
(describing the rule and its impact).
42
See Abraham & White, supra note 41, at 457–61 (describing repeal of the rule in various jurisdictions beginning
in the 1840s and continuing until the 1890s); John Fabian Witt, Toward a New History of American Accident Law:
Classical Tort Law and the Cooperative First-Party Insurance Movement, 114 HARV. L. REV. 690, 753–54
(describing the party disqualification rules and their origins).
43
See Abraham & White, supra note 41, at 433 (finding that “[f]ar fewer tort actions were brought at all, because
often the only evidence available to the plaintiff was his or her own account of what had happened, and that was
inadmissible.”).
44
Id. at 462.
37
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uniquely able to testify about, such as pain and suffering.45 The net effect was to reduce the
plaintiff’s incentive to pursue litigation.
A third obstacle to bringing a personal injury claim in the eighteenth and early nineteenth
century was that the new American states had adopted the then-contemporary common law of
England with its intricate pleading requirements.46 Under the writ system, if a claimant’s
attorney chose the wrong cause of action, his claim would be dismissed with prejudice.47 In
personal injury cases, the plaintiff’s attorney’s choice was typically between “trespass” or
“trespass vi et armis” for immediate harms and “trespass on the case” for consequential harms.48
Leame v. Bray,49 a contemporaneous English case, illustrates a typical accident of the time and
the intricacies of the trespass-case distinction. The defendant negligently drove his horse-drawn
carriage into the plaintiff’s carriage, causing plaintiff’s driver to be thrown to the ground, the
horses to run away with the plaintiff’s carriage, and the plaintiff to jump for his life, fracturing
his collarbone. The defendant contended that the injury was “consequential and not immediately
flowing from the forcible act of the defendant” and therefore, the only proper remedy was an
action for trespass on the case.50 The court, however, held that trespass was the proper tort
because the defendant’s application of force lead to a continuous set of activities that resulted in
the plaintiff’s injury.51 As one might imagine, the not-always-obvious application of these
technical pleading requirements to cases involving accidental injury discouraged many attorneys
from handling personal injury claims.
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Finally, the contingent fee agreement, which today is the virtually universal means of
compensating plaintiff’s attorneys in personal injury cases was most often regarded as
champerty,52 and therefore illegal, during the early decades of the nineteenth century.53 Then, as
now, it is likely that few victims of personal injuries could afford the fees charged by plaintiff’s
attorneys out of their own pockets. By the late-nineteenth century, contingent fee agreements
were widely viewed as legitimate, though still controversial.54
In summary, prior to the mid-nineteenth century, even when a victim sustained a serious,
tortiously inflicted injury, a number of factors precluded the filing of claims in the vast majority
of cases. These factors included the absence of liability insurance or defendants with sufficient
resources to adequately compensate the victim, the complexity of common law pleading rules,
the witness disqualification rule, and the prohibition of contingent fee agreements.

C. The Strict Liability Standard in the Law of the Pre-Industrial Era
Modern tort law often begins with the issue of whether liability for a personal injury is to
be determined under a fault-based (negligence) standard or a no-fault (strict liability) standard.55
Until the mid-nineteenth century, however, judges, scholars, and lawyers simply did not evaluate
potential liability in those terms. As described in the previous part, accidental personal injuries,
particularly those between strangers, were rare.56 Even more unusual were legal claims for those
injuries.57 When such claims were pursued, the focus of substantive law was on whether the
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claim should have been filed under the writ of trespass or the writ of trespass on the case, not
whether the governing substantive law required proof of fault on the defendant’s part.58 In short,
characterizing the law governing personal injuries in the pre-Industrial Revolution era through
the lens of later American tort law is fraught with ambiguity and uncertainty. 59
Having acknowledged these challenges, most legal historians agree that the negligence
regime that governed American tort law did not emerge until the mid-nineteenth century.
Horwitz concludes that “[a]t the beginning of the nineteenth century there was a general private
law presumption in favor of compensation, expressed by the oft-cited common law maxim sic
utere.”60 This strict or no-fault liability standard characterized the common law of England,61
which the American states continued to follow even after separation from the mother country.62
Horwitz argues that American common law decisions prior to the 1830s using the term
“negligence” referred to cases involving the defendant’s violation of a specific duty imposed by
contract, ordinance, or statute, not an obligation to use reasonable care to prevent harm
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generally.63 Legal historian Lawrence Friedman largely agrees with Horwitz’s interpretation that
the negligence standard governing personal injury cases did not arise until the mid-nineteenth
century:
All in all, tort law was not a highly developed field in 1776, or for a good many
years thereafter. Not a single treatise on the law of torts was published before
1850, on either side of the Atlantic. Negligence was the merest dot on the law. …
Existing tort law was simply not designed to deal with collision, derailments,
exploding boilers, and similar calamities. … American law had to work out on its
own schemes to distribute the burden of railroad and steamboat accidents … Tort
law was new law in the nineteenth century.64
In summary, until the mid-nineteenth century, the best evidence is that liability for
personal injury accidents was governed by a no-fault or strict liability standard. In spite of this,
the aggregate liability of American businesses was extremely modest because the accidental
injuries that did occur were not severe in most cases, and even serious injuries usually did not
lead to legal claims for compensation.

II. The First American Technological Revolution and the Development of
Negligence
New technologies profoundly changed the everyday life of many Americans during the
nineteenth century.65 In the process, these technological changes altered both how personal
injuries were inflicted and the severity of these injuries.66 Simultaneously, the manner in which
the legal system handled claims for compensation for such injuries, including both the
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substantive principles of tort law governing such claims67 and the process for handling such
claims,68 were radically transformed. In this part, I explore the relationship between these
technological and legal changes and consider whether the first was a cause of the second.69
A. The Industrial Revolution, Railroads, and the Resulting Human Carnage
In the century following American independence, citizens of the new republic typically
greeted the Industrial Revolution and the technological changes it brought with considerable
enthusiasm.70 Tenche Cox, an assistant of Alexander Hamilton’s at the Department of Treasury
described manufacturing technology as “the means of our POLITICAL SALVATION.”71 By the
early decades of the nineteenth century, most political leaders and journals lauded “the progress
of the age.”72 Merritt Roe Smith, a leading historian of technology, writes, “Decade by decade
the pace of technological change quickened—railroads, steamships, machine tools, telegraphy,
structures of iron and steel, electricity—and with each decade the popular enthusiasm for “men
of progress” and for their inventions grew.”73 There was, however, a darker side to this
unprecedented expansion of technology and industry. Witt writes that “[i]n the second half of
the nineteenth century, the United States experienced an accident crisis like none the world had
ever seen.”74
The process of mechanizing industrial processes in the United States began in the
second-half of the eighteenth century in textile mills75 and within two decades later in
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ironworks.76 As Witt notes, however, “mills did not present … the same dangers as the
railroads and the mines” later would.77
Lewis Mumford, a preeminent social historian of technology, later described the
Industrial Revolution as a transition from the “eotechnic” era, characterized by wood, water, and
handicrafts, to a new “paleotechnic” world of steam, iron, and factories.78 He wrote that “[t]he
specific triumph of the technical imagination rested on the ability to dissociate lifting power from
the arm and create a crane … [and] to dissociate work from the action of men and animals and
create the water-mill … .”79 In textile production, the technological change was one from handpowered looms to those powered by water. Although the severity of injuries to workers in textile
mills was not nearly as great as in some other nineteenth century industries, notably railroads and
mining, 63 percent of the injuries occurring in textile mills in Massachusetts were caused by
moving machinery and elevators.80 In the production of iron, the source of power soon shifted
from water power to steam power and blast furnaces that used hot air produced by the burning of
coal to heat the air injected into the hearth.81 In other words, with these technological advances,
it was machines, and no longer humans or animals, that supplied the force or the intense heat that
caused injuries to human beings. The force typically was much greater than that supplied during
the pre-industrial era by humans and animals and, as a result, the severity of the injury was likely
to be much greater.

76

See PURSELL, supra note 28, at 50–63 (describing the mechanization of iron-making).
WITT, supra note 32, at 54–55.
78
LEWIS MUMFORD, TECHNICS AND CIVILIZATION 151 (First Harbinger Books Edition 1963). See also BLACKFORD
& KERR, supra note 27, at 99 (identifying the fact that “new sources of power gained importance in the production
process” as a key aspect of industrialization).
79
MUMFORD, supra note 78, at 33; see also ERIK BRYNJOLFSSON & ANDREW MCAFEE, THE SECOND MACHINE AGE:
WORK, PROGRESS, AND PROSPERITY IN A TIME OF BRILLIANT TECHNOLOGIES 6–7 (2014) (observing that “[t]he
Industrial Revolution … allowed us to overcome the limitations of muscle power, human and animal, and generate
massive amounts of useful energy”).
80
See WITT, supra note 32, at 27.
81
See PURSELL, supra note 28, at 55–56, 63.
77

18

The mechanization of transportation, initially with steam-powered river boats and later,
more prominently, with railroad locomotives, led to a dramatic explosion of accidental injuries.
By 1850, 520 steamboats had been destroyed in accidents on American rivers, many due to
steam-boiler explosions.82 These explosions and other accidents killed many individuals on and
around the boats.83 The destructive impact of railroad steam locomotives, because of both their
weight and force and the coal or wood-fueled fires that powered them, was even greater. The
numbers of work-related injuries and deaths among railroads employees were simply
staggering.84 Additionally, railroad passengers,85 those riding in horse-drawn vehicles that
collided with trains, and individuals who walked alongside the tracks, frequently children, were
often killed or severely injured.86 By the decade of the 1890s, approximately six-thousand
people died annually from railroad accidents, and an additional forty thousand were injured.87
The creation of the vast railroad network in the United States in turn facilitated the
development of factories (manufacturing plants).88 Railroads hauled coal and other raw
materials to the plants, and delivered their products to distant locations.89 Both the mining of
coal and other minerals, and the manufacturing process itself became highly mechanized.90 As
was the case with railroads, the constant interaction of workers, frequently women and children,
with machinery in factories and mines caused the rates of death and serious injuries to skyrocket.
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As an extreme example, Witt reports that “in the anthracite coal mines of Pennsylvania, … each
year during the 1850s and 1860s, six percent of the workforce was killed, six percent
permanently crippled, and six percent seriously but temporarily disabled.”91 More generally,
during the last half of the nineteenth century, accidental death rates nearly doubled.92
B. The Burgeoning Frequency of Personal Injury Claims
As previously stated, few if any records exist that would allow scholars to quantify the
frequency of personal injury claims in the early nineteenth century.93 It seems likely, however,
that the number of claims increased significantly.94 In this part, I evaluate four factors that
contributed to increasing the proportion of personal injury accidents caused by other parties that
resulted in claims for compensation.
1. The Emergence of Large Business Enterprises
By the mid-nineteenth century, railroads and manufacturing firms had begun to
emerge as the first large, modern corporations.95 By the last decades of the century, employers
were large, bureaucratized corporations, and no longer firms and farms run by family members
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or close friends.96 Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means, in their foundational work on the American
corporation, remark on the “mere size” and the “tremendous aggregations of property” that
resulted from the emergence of the corporate structure.97 A corporate firm’s capital and
accumulated profits thus provided a ready fountain of compensation for injured employees.98 In
addition, personal injury victims who had been reluctant to file claims against their employers,
usually family members of close friends, 99 experienced little hesitation in seeking compensation
from faceless corporations. In short, the transition away from family-run and other small
businesses to large corporations both provided an incentive for an injured employee or other
victim to sue and eliminated a disincentive to sue.
2. Liability Insurance
Today, a very large percentage of the liabilities incurred by both corporations and
individuals are paid by their liability insurers.100 However, for all intents and purposes, liability
insurance was not invented until the late nineteenth century.101 By the middle of the century,
marine and fire insurance policies often covered first-party property damage claims.102 Whether
such policies covered harms to third-persons injured by the policyholder, however, had been
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debated and litigated for decades.103 On one hand, marine insurance sometimes covered liability
for collisions with other ships.104 It was here where insurance was for the first time understood
as a pooling of the more or less inevitable risks of causing harm to others as a result of
conducting one’s business.105 On the other hand, the validity of liability insurance policies was
questioned on the grounds that insuring against the consequences of negligence would lessen the
deterrent effect of tort liability.106
It was not until the last decades of the nineteenth century that insurance for personal
injuries began, initially in the form of first-party cooperative workingmen’s insurance
associations, often sponsored by trade unions.107 Commercial liability insurance, in the form of
“employer’s liability insurance[,] was first marketed … in the 1880s and designed to protect
employers” from liability for claims filed by workers.108 Within a few years, policies such as
these were expanded to cover liabilities owed to third parties other than the policyholder’s
employees.109
3. The Abolition of the Witness Disqualification Rule
As previously described,110 the witness disqualification rule was one of the factors
that made it more difficult for plaintiffs to recover for personal injury claims before the midnineteenth century. Kenneth Abraham and G. Edward White report that beginning in 1848,
states began to repeal the witness disqualification rule, and thirty-one states would do so by the
1880s.111
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The repeal of the party disqualification rule made it both more likely that injured parties
would sue tortfeasors and more likely that they would recover. Abraham and White appear to
offer the witness disqualification rule as an alternative explanation112 for the thesis expounded in
this Part of the Article that modern negligence law replaced an earlier strict liability regime
because courts realized that application of the law governing accident compensation ex ante
would have impeded progress in the development of industry and transportation networks in the
United States.113 Ultimately, however, they refrain from making this outright claim, and instead
assert that the witness disqualification rule delayed the change from strict liability to negligence
law for several decades after industrialization and the proliferation of railroads.114 Abraham and
White’s thesis, while convincing, does not refute the conclusion that over the long term, it was
the onslaught of personal injury claims resulting from the Industrial Revolution that
fundamentally transformed the law governing such claims from a strict liability standard to one
based on negligence.115
4. The Emergence of the First-Generation Specialized Personal Injury Bar
The final factor contributing to the growth of personal injury law during the last half of
the nineteenth century was the emergence of a group of attorneys specializing in the
representation of personal injury claimants. As noted previously, in the early nineteenth century,
courts almost always regarded the use of contingent fee arrangements by personal injury
attorneys as unlawful.116 By the middle of the century, however, legislatures and courts in most
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states had eliminated this prohibition.117 Beginning in the Jacksonian era, courts and legislatures
were less inclined to prohibit contingent fees as champterty and viewed them instead as a vehicle
to help those of limited means sue to vindicate their rights.118
The number of attorneys in New York City increased 49 percent during the single decade
of the 1890s.119 Strikingly, the increase in attorneys who were the children of immigrants, whom
Witt argues were more likely than other attorneys to specialize in representing personal injury
victims, was 85 percent.120 The rate of increase in the number of plaintiffs’ attorneys was even
dramatically greater in some other urban centers.121 These urban personal injury attorneys
employed “runners” who sought to arrive at an accident scene as soon as possible in order to sign
the injured victim to a contract with the runner’s employer,122 as well as “ward healers,
ambulance drivers, police, telephone operators, and hospital staff” who helped “identify and
recruit accident victims.”123 Plaintiff’s personal injury attorneys, with their immigrant
backgrounds and sometimes-questionable business practices, created controversy with leaders of
the bar and more established attorneys, particularly those representing businesses and insurance
companies.124
The relationship between the development of liability insurance, the abolition of the
witness disqualification rule, and the emergence of the specialized plaintiff’s injury bar, on one
hand, and the increase in the frequency of personal injury claims and the liability exposure of
large businesses, is a complicated one. Both the development of liability insurance and the
expansion of the personal injury bar no doubt contributed to the increase in the number of

117

See Kartsen, supra note 36, at 240–41.
Id.
119
See WITT, supra note 32, at 61.
120
Id.
121
Id. (giving the example of Buffalo where “the growth in the number of lawyers who were the white children of
immigrants was an astounding 170 percent from 1890 to 1900”)
122
Id. at 62.
123
See Kartsen, supra note 52, at 257.
124
Id. at 257–58.
118

24

claims, but these factors themselves resulted from the increase in the number of personal injuries
that occurred.
The cause-and-effect relationship between the abolition of the witness disqualification
rule and the increase in the number of personal injury claims is similarly bidirectional. The
ability of the plaintiff and interested family members to testify regarding the causes of the
accident certainly made it more likely that the injured victim would file suit. At the same time, it
seems likely that the prospect that victims would suffer increasingly severe (especially) and more
frequent injuries at the hands of anonymous, faceless corporations during the mid-nineteenth
century contributed to the demise of that rule. None of these variables are truly independent;
each is intertwined with others. What is clear is that all these changes, in whatever sequence,
took place on the heels of industrialization and the development of the vast railroad network.125

C. The Development of the Classical Negligence Regime
Legal scholars usually agree that the law governing personal injury claims changed from
a strict liability standard in 1820 to a negligence regime by 1870. With a fair number of
exceptions, that negligence regime continues to provide the basic framework for personal injury
law in the twenty-first century. In this Part, I describe how the law had changed by the last
decades of the nineteenth century. I also evaluate the competing theories for why this change
took place.
1. The Law Governing Liability for Personal Injuries by the late-Nineteenth Century
Most legal historians and tort scholars agree that by the last decades of the nineteenth
century, the law governing accidents was dramatically different and less hospitable to personal
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injury claims than it had been during the early decades of the century.126 Horwitz describes the
change in the law during the fifty-year period in dramatic terms: “[T]he rise of the negligence
principle in America overthrew basic eighteenth century private law categories and led to a
radical transformation … in the theory of legal liability.”127
The differences between the law governing liability for personal injuries in the early
nineteenth century and the corresponding law in the 1870s constitute the most consequential
changes in the history of American tort law. First, the injured victim was now required to prove
that the defendant acted negligently (with fault).128 Horwitz identifies three distinct phases in the
emergence of the negligence standard.129 During the first phase, in the early decades of the
nineteenth century, courts began to view negligence as a matter of misfeasance instead of solely
as a matter of nonfeasance, that is, the failure to fulfill a contractual or other autonomously
ordained duty. In the second phase, beginning in the 1820s, courts start to appreciate the
distinction between “cause” and “fault.” Even today, those not educated in the law often say that
one driver in a car collision “caused” the accident, when what they mean is that the driver was
the one at fault and not merely that her or his conduct was a necessary factual antecedent of the
collision. Finally, in the third phase of the development of negligence, according to Horwitz,
“beginning around 1840, the negligence doctrine breaks out of its rigid confinement to highway
and ship collision cases and begins directly to challenge the presumption of compensation for
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injury in [other] settled areas of the law.”130 By the late nineteenth century, the requirement that
the plaintiff prove negligence became particularly onerous, because most courts, at least in cases
involving claims brought by injured employees, found that if the defendant-employer’s conduct
corresponded with the custom in its trade or business, this established that the defendant was not
negligent as a matter of law.131
By the late nineteenth century, the negligence regime also included a trinity of
affirmative defenses—the fellow servant rule, assumption of risk, and contributory negligence—
that frequently prevented personal injury victims from recovering.132 During that era, the most
important of these defenses was the fellow servant rule.133 In his infamous opinion in Farwell v.
Boston & Worcester Railroad Corp.,134 Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw of the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court held that even though an employer was vicariously liable for the torts
committed by his employees acting within the scope of employment in most instances, an injured
employee could not recover from the employer for an injury caused by the tortious conduct of
another employee.135 The proffered justification for the doctrine was that the injured employee
was in a better position to be aware of the negligent conduct of his fellow employee than was the
employer.136 While such a rule could arguably be justified “with a small preindustrial workshop
in mind,” it “rested on unrealistic assumptions and was not suitable” when applied to “dangerous
equipment and a complex and compartmentalized workforce”137 of railroads and other large
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corporations in the late nineteenth century. Within decades after the virtually universal adoption
of the fellow-servant rule, some states repealed it by statute.138 Later, the Federal Employer’s
Liability Act, covering railroad employees among others, and state workers’ compensation acts,
abrogated the fellow-servant rule.139
The second of the common law defenses to the negligence action was “assumption of
risk,” which once again operated with particular harshness in cases brought by employees against
their employers.140 The phrase itself denotes three separate ways that a defendant may negate the
plaintiff’s recovery.141 Two of these ways, together categorized as “implied assumption of risk,”
often served as important obstacles to recovery for personal injury victims, particularly workers,
during the reign of classical negligence law. They also were often muddled.142 In the first
instance (which sometimes was called “primary implied” assumption of risk),143 the employer
was not liable if its workplace, despite posing dangers to workers, complied with a reasonable
standard of care, often construed to mean that it complied with the custom of other similar
employers.144 In the second sense of the term “assumption of risk,” even if the employer were
found to be negligent for subjecting the employee to unreasonable risks, it could still escape
liability for its “negligence if the employee, by accepting or continuing in the employment with
‘notice’ of such negligence, ‘assumed the risk.’”145
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The third and final affirmative defense to negligence was contributory negligence.
Today, in forty-six states, the victim’s own lack of reasonable care that contributed to her injury
will in many instances only reduce the plaintiff’s recovery, but in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century, the plaintiff’s contributory negligence served as a total bar to recovery. 146
Thus, the momentary mental lapse of the driver of a vehicle approaching a railroad crossing or a
worker waiting for a train to pass precluded recovery regardless of the level of egregiousness of
the defendant’s fault.147
In short, by the waning decades of the nineteenth century, there were far more barriers to
the recovery by personal injury victims than had been present during the first decades of the
century. The plaintiff now was required to prove fault. Even if it could be shown that the
defendant, usually a railroad, an employer, or another business, was negligent, recovery was
often prevented by one of the trinity of common law defenses, including the fellow-servant rule,
assumption of risk, and contributory negligence.
2. The Economic Explanation for the “Radical Transformation” of Nineteenth Century
Tort Law
The decidedly pro-defendant, substantial changes in the law governing liability for
personal injuries during the nineteenth century are temporally correlated with the Industrial
Revolution, especially the development of a vast railway network, and with the onslaught of
injuries these new enterprises caused. The question remains whether this technological
transformation of the economy in any way caused the equally dramatic changes in tort law. The
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prevailing view among legal historians, notably Horwitz and Friedman, is that it did.148
Friedman attributes the cause of what he describes as the “explosion of tort law” that
characterized the era to “the Industrial Revolution—the age of engines and machines.”149
However, Schwartz explicitly disagrees with the “Horwitz thesis.”150 Moreover, a competing
explanation for the emergence of the negligence regime contends that the new fault-based system
emerged as a consequence of mid-nineteenth century political liberal thought.151 It is unclear,
however, that these changes in liberal thought were truly independent of the Industrial
Revolution and the resulting technological transformation of the economy.152
Probably the leading explanation for the dramatic changes in tort law during the midnineteenth century is that these changes facilitated industrial and railroad expansion.153 If the
enterprises that emerged during the mid-nineteenth centuries had been held liable for the
majority of the injuries and damages they caused, as they would have been under the strict
liability principles that prevailed at the beginning of the century, so the theory goes, their
businesses would have been less profitable and would not have been able to attract new capital.
With the change to a system holding tortfeasors liable only for harms caused by their negligence,
often interpreted to mean “non-customary” conduct,154 the liability exposure of businesses
heavily invested in new technologies was almost assuredly substantially reduced. As a result,
railroads, mines, and factories flourished. In effect, the change from a strict liability to a
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negligence-based regime created a “subsidy” for railroads and other newly emerging
industries.155
The follow-up question is whether common law judges, including Chief Justice Lemuel
Shaw who decided both Brown v. Kendell and Farewell v. Boston & Worcester Railroad Corp.,
knowingly and/or intentionally subsidized railroads and other businesses. Friedman answers the
question this way:
But was Shaw also trying to subsidize the railroads? Perhaps not consciously. But
he must have been aware how popular it was to encourage the development of
railroads. Railroad building was popular, not only for people involved in what we
would now call big business, but for the ordinary farmer or merchant, eager to get
his goods to the market. It can hardly be a coincidence that so many emerging
doctrines of tort law tilted toward railroads and other enterprises. There was no
conspiracy. But there was, no doubt, a widespread consensus.156
Horwitz is much more explicit in calling the change in liability standards a “subsidy” for
railroads and other emerging businesses and in attributing distributional motives to the judges
responsible for these changes. He notes that state legislatures repeatedly had subsidized the
development of canals during the 1820s and 1830s by granting monopolies or franchises and
incurring debt, but without raising taxes.157 Substantial cash outlays to railroad corporations
would have required increases in taxes. One might conjecture that by the 1830s, entrepreneurs
who stood to profit from the development of railroads and other industrial enterprises had begun
to realize that increasing taxes to subsidize their projects was a two-edged sword. They may
have feared that such a practice would lead at least some Jacksonian state legislatures to
recognize the possibility of increasing taxes on the wealthy to benefit the less affluent.158 As
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Horwitz notes, “Change brought about through technical legal doctrine can more easily disguise
underlying political choices. Subsidy through the tax system, by contrast, inevitably involves
greater dangers of explicitly political conflict.”159
Schwartz takes strong exception to the subsidy thesis and Horwitz’s characterization of
the changes in nineteenth century tort law as a “radical transformation.” There are several
significant threads to his critique. First, as previously described, Schwartz contends that, at least
in the handful of states that he studied, elements of negligence law had emerged prior to 1830.160
However, his analysis did not include the dominant economic and legal hotspots of midnineteenth century America, such as New York, Massachusetts, or Pennsylvania. Further,
Schwartz did not and could not convincingly argue that the predominant standard for liability
during the later decades of the nineteenth century was anything other than a negligence standard
accompanied by the affirmative defenses of contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and the
fellow servant rule. Instead, he finds, more subtly, that although “[n]ineteenth-century tort law
in New Hampshire and California emphasized negligence as the standard of liability … , [c]ourts
were reluctant to find that economic factors justified a defendant’s risk-taking.”161 Similarly, he
argues that the cases surveyed sometimes displayed a “negligence standard with a highly
expansive quality”162 and although the New Hampshire and California supreme courts “from an
early date accepted the traditional rule of contributory negligence as a complete defense[,] …
[they] were openly ambivalent about the rule.”163 From these observations, he concludes that
“the nineteenth-century American negligence rule developed in a basically evolutionary way.”164
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Schwartz also directly rejects the thesis of Horwitz and Friedman that what drove the
change to the negligence regime was a desire to subsidize railroads and other emerging
industries. He chronicles several cases from California and New Hampshire in which the courts
generously applied the doctrines of the negligence regime and enabled plaintiffs to recover
against exactly these types of defendants.165
Assessing the debate between Horwitz and Friedman, on one hand, and Schwartz on the
other hand, Ely concludes “that the knotty history of railroad tort liability does not fully support
any unifying theory.”166 He explicitly notes the 1853 Tennessee Supreme Court decision in
Nashville & Chattanooga Railroad Company v. Messino,167 in which the court indicates that its
goals simultaneously included that “the most perfect safety should be secured” at the same time
that “the rules of accountability should be reasonable, that men may not be deterred from
devoting their time, capital, or energies to these very useful, and now almost indispensable
enterprises.”168 Similarly, after Professor (now Judge) Richard Posner surveyed tort opinions
issued between 1875 and 1905, he concluded that “the rules of liability seem to have been
broadly designed to bring about the efficient (cost-justified) level of accidents and safety… .”169
Of course, if the continued application of pre-1830s strict liability principles to newly emerging
industries and railroads would have deterred industrial and railroad expansion at a level that was
more than cost-justified, there is nothing in Posner’s finding that is inconsistent with the
Horwitz/Friedman thesis that the change in the law to the newly unfolding negligence regime
was consciously designed to facilitate industrial expansion.
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In tone, at least, Horwitz and, to a lesser extent, Friedman, may be overstating the
revolutionary quality of the change in nineteenth century tort law.170 Yet the American law
governing personal injury did change rather dramatically from a set of under-developed doctrines
based on an English writ system that had changed only slightly over the course of several
centuries, a body of law that had evolved to address entirely different harms. By the end of the
nineteenth-century, many accident victims whose injuries were inflicted by the fruits of
technological change were denied compensation on the grounds of tort doctrines that did not
exist a half-century earlier. The law governing liability for personal injury accidents changed
dramatically in the nineteenth century, and the pace of the change was radical compared to the
grudging pace of change that characterized the previous centuries of English and American
common law,171 a system where courts were presumed to follow precedents.172
3. Alternative Explanations for Changes in Nineteenth-Century Tort Law
G. Edward White173 and John Fabian Witt have both proffered alternative explanations to
what Witt refers to as the Horwtiz/Friedman “materialist”174 account of the rise of the negligence
regime.
White’s explanation focuses on “changes in intellectual thought” during the midnineteenth century and rejects the “subsidy thesis”, but he nevertheless acknowledges the primary
role of technological change as an instigator of the development of the negligence regime. He
begins by arguing that “[i]t is misleading … to speak of separate “tort” actions let alone standards
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of tort liability, before the nineteenth century.”175 Like Horwitz, he views the “growth of
negligence from the omission of a preexisting, specific duty owed to a limited class of persons to
the violation of a generalized standard of care owed to all.”176 The negligence regime, in his
mind, “seems to have been an intellectual response to the increased numbers of accidents
involving persons who had no preexisting relationship with one another—“stranger cases.”177
These accidents involving the interaction of strangers occurred far more frequently because of
new technologies, particularly railroads. According to White, changes in intellectual thought
combined with the carnage accidentally inflicted by new technologies to produce the negligence
regime. White writes that “Americans became more focused on individual freedom … and
occupational mobility.”178 As a result, “a new dynamic atomistic vision, which emphasized
man’s potential to alter the conditions under which he might exercise his capacity for
achievement,” emerged.179
Witt argues that the emergence of the negligence standard resulted from the influence of
the contemporaneous prevalence of what is often referred to as “nineteenth-century political
liberalism.”180 John Stuart Mill articulated a basic premise of this philosophy when he wrote that
“the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over” another “is to prevent harm
to others.”181 As Witt notes, a judicial decision imposing liability was seen by courts and legal
scholars of the time as an imposition on a defendant’s liberty.182 These lawmakers, influenced by
political liberalism, had no difficulty in holding a tortfeasor liable when it had been negligent and
the plaintiff was free of fault because in that instance, the court’s power was exercised “to prevent
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harm to others.”183 However, the situation in which a defendant had caused harm to a victim
without any fault on the defendant’s part posed a dilemma: how could they justify limiting the
defendant’s freedom when the defendant could not reasonably have avoided the harm?184 As
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., wrote in 1881, “[T]he prevailing view is that the state’s “cumbrous
and expensive machinery ought not to be set in motion unless some clear benefit is to be derived
from disturbing the status quo.”185 The wave of political liberalism led to an increased focused on
fault and moral wrongdoing in the law, as well as in other aspects of American society.186
Political liberalism, however, is not an alternative, independent explanation for the rise of
the negligence regime, but instead is itself, in least in part, a consequence of the Industrial
Revolution.187 The Industrial Revolution nurtured the development of the class of entrepreneurs
and managers who became the advocates for liberal political reform in the nineteenth century.188
Echoing the philosophy of Jeremy Bentham, mid-nineteenth century political liberalism saw
infringements on the free market, whether through legislation or excessive liabilities imposed by
common law courts, as threatening the security of property, social utility, and progress.189
Attributing the rise of negligence to political liberalism adds an intermediate step in the causal
chain between technological advances and the dramatic changes in nineteenth-century tort law,
but it does not eliminate the relationship.
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D. Technology as the Cause of the Classical Negligence Regime
By the 1870s, as Witt describes it, the United States was experiencing an unprecedented
accidental injury crisis190 that led to the first major transformation of American tort law. This
dramatic change, from a strict liability standard to the negligence regime, resulted from a judicial
weighing of the aggregate liability facing railroads and other industrial defendants against the
social utility of such industries. The increase in aggregate liability was a product of the
increased severity of personal injury accidents during the industrial era,191 a possible increase in
the frequency of such accidents,192 and several factors making it easier for plaintiffs to prove
their claims, each of which was itself a consequence of new technologies. The witness
disqualification rule was abrogated193 and a professional plaintiff’s personal injury bar emerged
for the first time.194 Further, the development of large-scale corporations and liability
insurance195 afforded victims a source of meaningful compensation, as well as an incentive for
attorneys retained on a contingent-fee basis to pursue their claims. Each of these developments,
however, themselves resulted from the increase in the liability exposure of railroads and other
industrial defendants.196
In addition, to the threatened increase in aggregate liability, the decisive variable
responsible for the transformation from the pre-industrial strict liability rules to the negligence
regime that emerged during the mid-nineteenth century was the perceived (and genuine) social
utility of railroads and other industrial enterprises.197 At a time when Americans were
enthusiastically supportive of railroads and other new technologies, the application of tort law
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that existed at the turn of the nineteenth century likely would have discouraged the capital
contributions necessary to expand these new technologies.
Compelling evidence indicates that by late-nineteenth century, the substantive law
governing claims for personal injuries was more daunting to the personal injury victim that it had
been a half-century earlier. Plaintiffs were required to prove negligence.198 Correspondence
with custom by defendants either established compliance with due care as a matter of law or at
least was strong evidence of a lack of negligence.199 Perhaps most importantly, many victims,
particularly employees of railroads and other industrial enterprises, were barred from recovery
by the fellow-servant rule,200 assumption of risk,201 and contributory negligence.202 These
changes in substantive law, the most important changes in the law governing liability for
personal injuries in at least five hundred years, occurred during the same half-century as did the
most important changes in how technology affected ordinary human life that had occurred at any
point in human history to that time.

III. The Legal Aftershocks of the Industrial Revolution
The most significant transformation of American tort law was the victory of the
negligence regime during the mid-nineteenth century. In the early twenty-first century,
American society faces the prospect of the second American tort revolution: the substantive
law’s response to autonomous vehicles, robotics, and artificial intelligence.203 During the
intervening period of more than a century, American accident compensation law also witnessed
additional significant changes: notably, the enactment of the workers’ compensation system,204
the routinized processing of claims arising from automobile accidents applying informal rules
198
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that often conflicted with the formal law,205 and the rise (and fall) of strict products liability, each
of which can be traced to changes in the economic structure resulting from technological
development.206 In this Part, I trace the origins of these legal developments to aftershocks of the
Industrial Revolution.

A. The Factory System and the Enactment of Workers’ Compensation
The economic changes resulting from the “second Industrial Revolution”207 were far
from completed by the end of the nineteenth century. Even as late as the 1870s, most American
families remained largely unaffected by the technological changes of the nineteenth century.
Most Americans continued to wear clothing handcrafted at home and eat food that they had
raised.208 Horses, not machines, provided most transportation.209 Appliances such as
refrigerators and gas or electric powered stoves were still far in the future.
As previously noted,210 however, the propagation of railroads and other technological
developments, paved the way for the development of factories.211 Railroads shipped raw
materials to factories and in turn, and more importantly, distributed their products to a
widespread national market. Without railroads or a similar transportation system, mass
production of consumer goods on the assembly line would have been impossible.
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Simultaneously with the proliferation of factories, railroad networks continued to expand212 and
machinery became a ubiquitous feature of American life, particularly in workplaces.213
As described in Part II, the negligence regime, particularly the application of its fellowservant rule, made it exceptionally difficult for workers to recover for injuries sustained during
their employment. By the turn of the twentieth century, this situation was intolerable to workers,
their unions, and social reformers.214 At the same time, corporate employers feared that the
onerous consequences of the fellow-servant rule doomed it and that its abrogation within the
common-law system would result in greatly expanded aggregate corporate liability. 215 American
corporations increasingly feared massive common-law liability exposure as liability insurance
and accumulated profits made them attractive targets216 from the new professionalized plaintiff’s
bar.217
The result, in the second decade of the twentieth century, was the widespread enactment
of workers’ compensation statutes.218 Under workers’ compensation, workers injured in the
course of employment recovered benefits without proving fault on the employer’s part.219
Further, and more importantly, the statutes eliminated the affirmative defenses of the fellowservant rule, assumption of risk, and contributory negligence.220 However, workers’
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compensation acts eliminated the right of injured workers to have a jury adjudicate their claims,
and compensation under the acts was severely limited.221 Claimants received no compensation
for noneconomic injuries (“pain and suffering”), recovery for loss of income was significantly
limited,222 and future medical expenses were paid as they were incurred. It was also believed
that workers’ compensation would substantially reduce the transaction costs involved in
adjudicating claims.223 Administrative hearings replaced jury trials,224 and attorney fees for
claimants’ attorneys were strictly limited.225
The enactment of workers’ compensation statutes and the Federal Employers Liability
Act are most accurately interpreted as necessary counter moves to the development of the
classical negligence regime that was not fully satisfactory to either employers or to their workers.
The critical variable for injured workers and their union representatives was the increased
difficulty of proving the employer’s negligence in an industrialized workplace dominated by
machine technology.226 Businesses, however, feared that any return to a strict-liability common
law system in an attempt to ease proof of liability would increase their aggregate liability
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exposure. These concerns likely would cause them to cut-back or slowdown their business
activities that continued to be perceived as offering great social utility.227
The solution, workers’ compensation, dramatically reduced the difficulty of proving the
prerequisites of liability by abrogating the need to prove fault and in the process reduced
transaction costs by replacing common-law juries with professional administrative agencies.228
At the same time, the workers’ compensation system moderated the feared increase in the
liability exposure facing employers and made it more predictable. The severity of paid claims
was reduced by disallowing recovery for noneconomic damages, capping recovery for economic
losses, and placing responsibility for assessing the amount of damages to be paid with
administrative agencies instead of common law juries.
Following the adoption of workers’ compensation, the frequency of claims for personal
injuries resulting from employment greatly increased.229 The increase in claims was so dramatic
that employers’ aggregate liability exposure increased, even though the average amount of paid
claims was reduced because of capped benefits and the lack of compensation for noneconomic
damages. With that increase, however, employers received assurance that they would not be
slammed with a huge verdict in any single case and that future changes in the common law, such
as the abolition of the fellow-servant rule, would not greatly increase their liability exposure for
workplace accidents.230
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B. The “Evil Deity’s”231 Gift of the Automobile
The widespread ownership and use of automobiles dramatically increased the scope of
the accidental-injury problem in the United States. Jonathan Simon writes that “[i]n 1919 the
automobile was still largely seen as a luxury item,” but “[b]y 1929, … it was visibly
transforming American life.232 More than 3,735,000 new automobiles were sold in 1925, and by
the end of the decade, one-half of American households owned an automobile.233 The social
utility of the widespread use of the automobile was obvious. As Nora Engstrom observes,
“automobiles are central to the American way of life, ‘permitting an impatient people to conquer
space and time.’ ”234
With the advent of the automobile, the number of machines capable of inflicting serious
personal injuries dramatically increased, and these machines and their “attendant carnage” were
“broadly distributed across the social landscape.”235 Writing in the Columbia Law Review in
1925, Robert Marx observed:
Formerly, when horse drawn vehicles, slow in movement and few in number,
were the principal means of transportation, there was comparatively little danger
in the use of the streets. But the increasing use and speed of automobiles have
made our streets more dangerous than our factories and are causing a greater loss
of life and a greater number of casualties or losses than in the World War.236
The automobile fatality rate increased five-hundred percent between 1913 and 1931.237
Thirty-three thousand people died in automobile accidents in 1930,238 a number only slightly less
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than the thirty-five thousand that died in 2010, despite the dramatic increase during that period of
time in both the number of automobiles and the number of miles driven.239 In 1929, automobile
accidents accounted for twenty-nine percent of all accidental deaths, as compared with seven
percent caused by railroad accidents.240 The distribution of the severity of these claims included
many serious injuries.241 Even today, a majority of all torts claims arise from automobile
accidents, as does three-quarters of the aggregate compensatory payments for tort claims.242
Just as is the case today, in the 1930s, few owners and operators of automobile possess
the financial resources to enable them to personally compensate those seriously injured in traffic
accidents.243 Unlike in the nineteenth century when large industrial and transportation
enterprises were liable for the torts committed by their employees,244 the more limited resources
of most automobile owners posed the threat that there would be no source of funds to
compensate victims of automobile accidents. In the automobile context, the primary objective of
liability insurance became to provide a source of compensation for the injured victim rather than
to protect the assets of the tortfeasor.245 Unfortunately, only twenty-seven percent of all
automobiles registered in 1929 had liability insurance coverage.246 At the same time, however,
states were beginning to adopt “financial responsibility laws” that required automobile owners to
either purchase insurance or to provide proof that they had sufficient financial resources to pay
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claims.247 By 1935 a majority of states had enacted such statutes.248 Today forty-nine states
mandate that automobile owners carry liability insurance, and the remaining state has a financial
responsibility law.249
Following closely on the heels of the adoption of workers’ compensation systems, the
automobile-accident problem suggested the adoption of a no-fault compensation system. In
addition to the reality that insurance usually provided the only source of funds for compensation,
“[o]btaining agreement on what constituted careless behavior [and] proving what had happened”
posed challenges to the traditional tort system.250 Simon observes that “[t]he power and speed of
motorized machinery … simply outstripped the capacity of even careful persons to guard against
mishap, and magnified the consequences of lapses of care beyond moral recognition.”251
Additionally, the limits of the owner’s insurance policy functionally capped recovery. Most but
not all injuries were relatively minor. The limited size of many claims suggested finding a less
costly and time-consuming resolution of claims.
As early as 1932, a distinguished group of judges, lawyers, and law professors, assisted
by two professional sociologists, proposed a no-fault compensation plan that generally is referred
to as the “the Columbia Plan,”252 which echoed the structure of workers’ compensation—a nofault process providing limited benefits through an administrative compensation system.
However, it was not until Robert Keeton and Jeffrey O’Connell proposed a no-fault system that
retained elements of traditional tort law in 1965253 that states began to adopt automobile no fault.
The basic plan, known as Personal Injury Protection (PIP), mandated that each auto owner
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purchase first-party coverage that would cover the economic expenses, including medical
expenses and lost wages, suffered by drivers and passengers in an automobile involved in a
collision, as well as those of any injured pedestrians.254 These economic losses were capped at
relatively modest amounts, and there was no recovery for noneconomic losses. However,
seriously injured victims of accidents, whose injuries either fell within articulated categories of
more severe injuries or whose medical expenses exceeded statutorily-defined monetary
thresholds, were able to sue in tort to recover noneconomic damages.255 A few states merely
enacted “add-on” no-fault programs that provided victims with an alternative for seeking
compensation for defined economic losses without restricting access to the court system.256
By 1976, more than two-dozen states had enacted some form of no-fault compensation
systems.257 However, no state has followed suit since 1976, and a number of states have
repealed their mandatory no-fault plans.258 Proponents of no-fault legislation promised that nofault insurance would be less expensive than that in the negligence-based system,259 but that
predication failed to materialize.260 A recent, comprehensive RAND analysis concludes that the
primary cause of higher than anticipated no-fault premium rates is that reimbursed medical costs
in no-fault states are higher than in traditional tort states.261 Further, insurers in no-fault states
now are paying the same portion of victims’ noneconomic losses as those in fault-based states,262
presumably because victims in no-fault states are able to file common-law actions for
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noneconomic damages if their medical bills exceed a designated dollar threshold or fall within
certain prescribed categories of injuries. Finally, the higher costs of no-fault insurance in part
reflects its comparative advantages over traditional liability insurance: compensation of a larger
proportion of those injured in automobile accidents,263 faster claims reimbursement, and greater
consumer satisfaction.264
Despite the prevailing trend away from formal automobile no-fault compensation
systems, even in jurisdictions that nominally retain the traditional negligence-liability insurance
system, the reality is that auto-claims processing functions much like a no-fault system.265 The
routinization of auto claims results from the combination that the only funds available to pay a
judgment in most cases is the automobile insurance policy, usually with fairly modest limits, and
that such claims are handled by “repeat players” on both sides, insurance claims adjusters and
plaintiffs’ attorneys who specialize in such claims.266 Often, such claims are simply settled at the
amount of the liability policy.267
Far more importantly for our purposes, fault plays a far less dominant role in the
settlement process than would be expected if these negotiators were truly “bargaining in the
shadow of the law”268 of the negligence regime. In his comprehensive study of the claims
settlement process published in 1970,269 H. Laurence Ross found that the negligence regime’s
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requirement that there be fault for liability was frequently not observed.270 In order to settle
cases quickly and expeditiously, the negotiating partners’ determination of liability focused
largely on whether one or both parties violated traffic laws.271 However, Ross observed that in
the “large majority of cases, … a claimant who has provable economic losses will recover
something.”272 In virtually all cases, according to Ross, the claimant recovers at least her or his
medical expenses.273 The determination of damages is also routinized, usually as some multiple
of “medical expenses,” often “three-times medicals.”274
In recent years, the routinization of automobile claims has resulted in “settlement mills,”
plaintiffs’ firms that specialize in automobile claims and often dominate the local market for
such services.275 Such firms market aggressively, do little or no vetting of claims when they
accept their clients, and handle extremely high caseloads.276 Settlement mills often engage in
mass settlements, packaging claims that are weaker on the merits with those that are stronger.277
As Engstrom reports, “even cases with serious liability issues are often amicably resolved.
Insurers will offer something … for nearly every claim.”278
In short, in practice the processing of routine automobile claims more closely resembles
the workers’ compensation system than it does the traditional negligence model. Claimants who
can prove medical expenses recover compensation, even if the case for liability is weak or
nonexistent. Like workers’ compensation, the amount of the settlement is often formulaic.
Claims processing is swift, and what would happen at trial is of minor interest at best.
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Settlements are capped either by a formula such as “three times specials” or by the limits of the
defendants’ insurance policies.
C. The Rise and Fall of Strict Products Liability
The mass production of automobiles and other consumer products also led to changes in
the law governing what injured consumers or users of products needed to prove to recover
damages from product manufacturers for personal injuries.
1. The End of the Privity Requirement
At the turn of the twentieth-century, it was generally impossible for victims to
successfully sue the distant manufacturers whom had replaced local craftsman as the producers
of household items.279 Before the Industrial Revolution, Americans generally relied upon
themselves, family members, and local craft and trade individuals to supply the goods that they
used in daily life.280 That all changed in the early twentieth century with the development of
mass production factories and extensive railroad networks.281 The manufacturer and the product
consumer now rarely met one another. Instead, the manufacturer sold its finished products to a
chain of one or more distributors who then sold their products to retailers who finally sold their
products to consumers. Ultimately, the finished product played a role in injuring the consumer,
another user of the product, or even a bystander.282
In the nineteenth century, the law had not caught up with these changes in the economy
that resulted from technological change. Those injured by defective products were precluded
from recovering from manufacturers because English and American courts had consistently held
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that the supplier of a product owed a duty of care only to those in “privity,” that is, linked by a
direct contractual relationship, with the manufacturer.283 In the seminal decision in MacPherson
v. Buick Motor Co.,284 Judge Cardozo held that an automobile manufacturer owed a duty of care
to a user of a product “to make it carefully” whenever “it is reasonably certain to place life and
limb in peril when negligently made.”285 In doing so, Cardozo explicitly acknowledged the
technological impetus for this important change in the law: “Precedents drawn from the days of
travel by stage coach do not fit the conditions of travel today.”286 He went on to stress the
appropriateness of changing the law to “the needs of life in a developing civilization.”287
2. The Emergence of “Strict” Products Liability
A few decades later, between the early 1960s and the mid-1980s, the mass production,
consumer society prompted the development of “strict products liability,” which at the time
appeared to be “the most radical and spectacular” change in American tort law during the
twentieth century.288 At least facially at the time of its emergence, this new regime governing
the liability of product manufacturers and other product sellers to the purchasers and users of
their products, as well as bystanders injured by the products, did not require the plaintiff to prove
fault or negligence.289 As such, strict products liability appeared to create an important commonlaw exception to the general requirement that the personal injury claimant prove that the
defendant acted with fault.290
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The causal connection between technological change in the economy and the emergence
of strict products liability was unambiguously described in the profound concurring opinion of a
then-young California Supreme Court Justice, Roger Traynor, in Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling
Co.,291 decided in 1941. Justice Traynor contended that a manufacturer should be held liable to
an injured consumer even without proof of negligence, in part because of the difficulty the
injured consumer typically experienced in proving that the manufacturer was negligent:
As handicrafts have been replaced by mass production with its great markets and
transportation facilities, the close relationship between the producer and consumer
of a product has been altered. Manufacturing processes … are ordinarily either
inaccessible to or beyond the ken of the general public. The consumer no longer
has means or skill enough to investigate for himself the soundness of a product,
… and his erstwhile vigilance has been lulled by the steady efforts of
manufacturers to build up confidence by advertising … .292
Traynor also wrote that the technologically induced changes in the economy meant that
the manufacturer is in a better position to minimize losses by anticipating the risks posed by
products and preventing repetitive injuries from such products.293 Finally, Justice Traynor
recognized that the manufacturer is in a better position to spread the losses sustained by
consumers: “The cost of an injury and the loss of time or health may be an overwhelming
misfortune to the person injured, and a needless one, for the risk of injury can be insured by the
manufacturer and distributed among the public as a cost of doing business.”294 By the mid-
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liability when an article that he has placed on the market … proves to have a defect that causes injury to human
beings.”).
292
Id. at 443.
293
Id. at 443 (concluding that “[t]he consumer no longer has means or skill enough to investigate for himself the
soundness of a product.”).
294
Id. at 441.
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1980s, virtually all American jurisdictions had adopted a strict liability standard in products
cases.295
3. The Reversion to Fault-Based Standards in Products Liability
In fact, there was less to the apparent change from a negligence standard to a strict
liability standard in products liability cases that occurred between the early1960s and the mid1980s than met the eye. The early strict product liability cases were ones involving what is now
known as a “manufacturing defect,” that is, “when the product departs from its intended
design.”296 Schwartz argued, consistent with Justice Traynor’s “difficulty of proving
negligence” rationale for strict product liability in Escola,297 that there is a high correlation
between manufacturing defects and negligence.298
Even if one accepts at face value the assertion that liability for manufacturing defects is
decided under a “true strict liability”299 standard that sometimes produces different results from
those under a negligence standard, the fact remains that a majority of products litigation involves
“design” and “warning” defects, not manufacturing defects.300 In other words, even when a
product “conforms to the intended design,” it might not be reasonably safe because “the intended
design itself” or the lack of adequate instructions or warnings makes it unreasonably unsafe.301
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See 3 HARPER ET AL., supra note 141, §28.15 n.7 (noting that at least 46 states have adopted strict products
liability or its functional equivalent).
296
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1998). See Richard L. Cupp Jr.
& Danielle Polage, The Rhetoric of Strict Products Liability Versus Negligence: An Empirical Analysis, 77
N.Y.U.L. REV. 874, 889 (2002) (stating that “[m]ost of the early cases applying strict liability in tort involved
manufacturing defects rather than design defects or inadequate warnings.”).
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See supra note 292 and accompanying text.
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See Gary T. Schwartz, The Beginning and Possible End of The Rise of Modern American Tort Law, 26 GA. L.
REV. 601, 624 (1992) (arguing that strict liability does not “dramatically chang[e] … the pattern of litigation results
… under a negligence standard”).
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David Owen, Products Liability Law Restated, 49 S.C. L. REV. 273, 283–84 (1998) (noting that the standard of
liability for manufacturing defects contained in the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability originates with
contract law).
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See MARK A. GEISTFELD, PRINCIPLES OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY 85 n.1 (2006) (finding that in a 1985 study of
products liability claims over $100,000, the majority were based on design defects).
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See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY §1, cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1998).
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In the early years of strict product liability, courts focused on manufacturing defects. 302
In the comparatively infrequent number of cases in which the issue arose, courts typically
addressed the issue of whether a design defect was present through the lens of the “consumer
expectations test,303 that is, whether the product was “dangerous to an extent beyond that which
would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it.”304 By the mid-1970s,
however, courts began to move toward the “risk-utility” test for determining whether there is a
design defect that provides that such a defect existed only if the costs of taking additional
precautions is less than the “probability and seriousness of harm” that would be prevented.305
The risk-utility test, of course, is a version of the cost-benefit analysis or “Hand formula”306 that
defines negligence. In short, the risk-utility test for design defects marks a return to a negligence

Id. (stating that “[i]mposition of liability for design defects … was relatively infrequent until the late 1960s and
early 1970s).
303
See OWEN, supra note 282, § 5.6, at 292–99.
304
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §402A, cmt. i (AM. LAW INST. 1965); see also id. at cmt. g (stating that strict
liability “applies only where the product is … in a condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer, which will
be unreasonably dangerous to him.”). The consumer expectations test, with its origins in the law of warranty, see
OWEN, supra note 282, at 291, does not require negligence on the part of the manufacturer or other seller, and
therefore can legitimately be classified as a form of strict liability. However, courts soon encountered a variety of
problems in applying the consumer expectations test, notably the vagueness of the test, particularly when jurors
applied it to technologically complex products. Id. at 29. See, e.g., Heaton v. Ford Motor Co., 435 P.2d 806, 809
(Or. 1967) (stating that a jury would have to speculate how a 5-to-6-inch rock would normally damage a truck
traveling on a highway because “[h]igh-speed collisions with large rocks are not so common … that the average
person would know from personal experience what to expect under the circumstances.”).
305
Raney v. Honeywell, Inc., 540 F.2d 932, 935 (8th Cir. 1976). The risk-utility test involves “a balancing of the
probability and seriousness of harm against the costs of taking precautions. Relevant factors to be considered
include the availability of alternative designs, the cost and feasibility of adopting alternative designs and the
frequency or infrequency of injury resulting from the design.” Id. (citations omitted).
306
See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (Hand, L., J.) (describing the costbenefit test for negligence using algebraic terms); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR
PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 3 (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (stating that “[p]rimary factors to consider in
ascertaining whether the person’s conduct lacks reasonable care are the foreseeable likelihood that the person’s
conduct will result in harm, the foreseeable severity of any harm that may ensue, and the burden of precautions to
eliminate or reduce the risk of harm.”); Posner, supra note 153, at 32–34 (endorsing “Learned Hand’s famous
formulation”).
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standard.307 In 1998, the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability adopted a variant of
the risk-utility test for design defects,308 and today most courts follow the risk-utility approach.309
Similarly, the law governing warning defects also has largely returned to a negligence
standard. The Restatement (Third), for example, indicates that a warning defect exists only
“when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided by
the provision of reasonable instructions or warnings.”310 The Restatement reporters observed that
“[a]n overwhelming majority of jurisdictions supports the proposition that a manufacturer has a
duty to warn only of risks that were known or should have been known to a reasonable
person.”311 This same basic principle inheres in what became known as the “state-of-the-art”
defense,312 under which compliance with “the level of scientific and technological knowledge
existing at the time the product in question was designed for manufacture” is generally regarded
as either a total bar to liability or at least a factor that the jury could consider in deciding whether
a product was defective.313 The state of the art defense essentially turns strict liability for failure
to warn into negligence for failure to warn. In any event, courts and commentators usually agree
that today, liability in negligence for failure to warn and under a strict liability warning defect
307

In the 1960s, John Wade and W. Page Keeton each independently argued that the distinction between negligence
and strict product liability should be that under strict liability, knowledge of a product risk, even if it were not
reasonably foreseeable, should be imputed to the manufacturer. See W. Page Keeton, Products Liability—
Inadequacy of Information, 48 TEX. L. REV. 398, 404 (1970); John W. Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers,
19 SW. L.J. 5, 15 (1965); see also Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng’r Co., 386 A.2d 816, 826–27 (N.J. 1978) (adopting
principle). Over the longer term, however, this view has rarely prevailed. See infra notes 312–316 and
accompanying text.
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RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1998) (adopting standard of riskutility analysis with a requirement of an available “reasonable alternative design” that would make the product
safer).
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See OWEN, supra note 282, at 299 (reporting that (reporting that “most courts … use some form of ‘risk-utility’
… test).
310
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(c).
311
Id. at cmt. m. (citing leading cases).
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True strict liability in warning cases would mean that manufacturers could be held liable if they failed to warn of
a risk of which they neither were aware nor reasonably should have been aware. See, e.g., Beshada v. JohnsManville Prods. Corp., 447 A.2d 539, 546–47 (N.J. 1982) (holding manufacturer liable for failure to warn of
unknowable risks because of the risk-distribution goal of strict product liability). However, decisions imposing this
type of strict liability in warning cases usually did not last long. See e.g., Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 479 A.2d 374,
386 (N.J. 1984) (stating that pharmaceutical manufacturer’s “conduct should be measured by knowledge at the time
the manufacturer distributed the product.”).
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Potter v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 694 A.2d 1319, 1346–47 (Conn. 1997) (discussing application of state of
the art in warning and defect cases).
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claim are essentially coterminous.314 Additionally, in design defect cases, the requirement that
the plaintiff prove the availability of a reasonable alternative design315 in effect brings state of
the art back into the equation as a complete defense: the Restatement defines “reasonable” in this
context to mean “technologically feasible and practical.”316
By the mid-1980s, the reaction against “strict” products liability spread from the judicial
arena to state and federal legislative halls.317 Legislators perceived, accurately or not, that strict
products liability imperiled the activities of product manufacturers and distributors that they
deemed to possess great social utility.318 The less common variety of tort reform statutes
restricted the circumstances in which victims were able to recover from defendants,319 while
more widespread statutory reforms limited the amount of damages that a successful claimant
could recover from a manufacturer.320
4. Assessing the Product Liability “Revolution”
In and of itself, the early twentieth-century decision in MacPherson321 marked a dramatic
change in the American law governing personal injuries by expanding the duty of care owed by
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See, e.g., Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 810 P.2d 549, 561 (Cal. 1991) (Mosk, J., concurring and
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See Joanna M. Shepherd, Products Liability and Economic Activity: An Empirical Analysis of Tort Reform’s
Impact on Businesses, Employment, and Production, 66 VAND. L. REV. 257, 258–59 (2013) (reporting that tort
reform advocates “have won numerous victories as legislatures continue to enact reforms that reduce the scope of
products liability.”).
318
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WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.72.010 (LexisNexis 2016) (barring products liability for sellers of used products).
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E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.76 (LexisNexis 2013) (mandating that courts deduct the amount of compensation
received from collateral sources in some circumstances); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 11–108 (LexisNexis
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manufacturers and other possible defendants to all foreseeable victims of their negligence.
Additionally, in the 1960s and the 1970s, most courts replaced the heretofore dominant
negligence regime with a standard of strict liability for product liability cases, at least in cases
involving manufacturing defects, the type of product defects that had almost exclusively
dominated claims until that point. These two changes, marking significant modification of the
preexisting negligence regime, resulted largely from the difficulty of proving liability in a
products cases under the ex-ante negligence standard. In the early years of strict products
liability, there can be little doubt that these changes increased the frequency of product liability
claims, even if the issue of whether this growth in claims continued into the 1980s is strongly
contested.322
The subsequent extension of true strict liability to design and warning defects met with
far less success and sparked a substantial reversion to the preexisting negligence regime. The
more restrictive court decisions and legislative enactments beginning in the 1980s reflected the
arguments of manufacturers and their insurers that the increases in the aggregate liability they
faced as a result of strict product liability stifled economic activity, drove companies out of
business, and prevented products from coming to the market.323 As was the case a century
earlier when courts cut back on the liability exposure of railroads and other industries,
legislatures, in particular, acted on the belief that the social utility of these defendants’ activities
justified decreasing their liability exposure. The net result, at least for liability exposure
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Compare Theodore Eisenberg & James A. Henderson, Jr., Inside the Quiet Revolution in Products Liability, 39
UCLA L. REV. 731, 748–49 (1992) (observing a decline in both the number of product liability claims filed and
plaintiff success rates in the 1980s), with Shepherd, supra note 317, at 266–67 (reporting an increase in products
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See, e.g., Product Liability Reform, AM. TORT REFORM ASS'N, http://www.atra.org/ issue/product-liability/ (last
visited Sept. 17, 2017); Torts of the Future, U.S. CHAMBER: INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM (Mar. 29, 2017),
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resulting from design and warning defects, is that for the most part, the so-called “products
liability revolution” now appears to have been largely a faux revolution.

IV. The Association between Technological Progress and Changes in the Law of
Personal Injury Compensation
The substantial changes in tort doctrine described in this Article indicate an association
between technological and doctrinal change. New waves of technology and the changes in the
economy that come with them result in varying (1) frequencies of personal injuries, (2) severities
of such injuries, (3) degrees of difficulty in proving claims for compensation, and (4) magnitudes
of social utility. Analysis of these factors determines whether the ex-ante rules governing
liability for personal injuries are likely to change and, specifically, whether the new doctrinal
structure governing liability will be based on common-law fault (negligence), common-law strict
liability, or a legislatively-mandated no fault compensation system that limits damages
recoverable by claimants.
The first factor is the frequency of personal injuries resulting from the widespread
adoption of a new wave of technologies. For example, the technological changes of the midand-late nineteenth century likely increased the frequency of personal injuries and certainly
increased the frequency of nontrivial injuries leading to legal claims.324 As the complexity of the
machinery causing injury increased, the result was a greater likelihood that the operation of the
machinery would malfunction. Moreover, because accidents involving machinery were much
more likely than those during the preindustrial era to result in severe injuries, a higher percentage
of injured victims filed claims.
The second factor, the severity of the resulting injuries, is an even more important
determinant of doctrinal change. As the level of technology continually advanced from the first
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See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
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half of the nineteenth century through the first half of the twentieth century, injuries became
more severe.325 Locomotives, automobiles, and industrial machinery were more likely to result
in crippling or even fatal injuries than were horses that threw a rider or the carelessness of coworkers using hand-tools.
The third technologically-inspired factor impacting the tort liability standard is the
difficulty that victims experience in proving claims against the tortfeasors whose conduct caused
the injuries. For example, it was more difficult for a worker employed in a massive factory or
working for a railroad to prove both causation and fault than it was for a victim injured by a coworker in an early nineteenth-century craft shop. Similarly, it is even more difficult to establish
causation and fault in a products liability case when the harm was caused by a product
manufactured at a factory distant in location, and possibly distant in time as well.
The product of the frequency of additional paid claims resulting from a new set of
technological changes times the mean severity of these paid claims yields the amount of the
societal increase in the aggregate liability exposure of tortfeasors. The frequency of paid claims
is affected not only by the frequency of personal injuries, but also by the difficulty of proving the
claim. The greater the difficulty, the less the liability exposure of tortfeasors.
The fourth and final variable affecting tort liability is the change in social utility resulting
from each new wave of technological innovation. To the extent that courts and legislatures
perceive that new technologies offer great social utility, they are less likely to either impose strict
liability or require the tortfeasor to fully compensate the victim for all damages.
Obviously, the first, second, and fourth factors echo the variables incorporated in Judge
Learned Hand’s quasi-algebraic formula for determining whether any particular defendant’s or
plaintiff’s conduct was negligent, but apply these same variables to the aggregate changes in the
economy caused by a new set of technological and technologically-inspired economic
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changes.326 The third factor, the difficulty of proving liability in the face of new technological
developments, is suggested by Justice Traynor’s concurring opinion in Escola v. Coca Cola
Bottling Co.327
It is not clear in the abstract which direction any increase in either of the first two factors,
the frequency or severity of personal injuries, pushes the liability standard. On one hand, an
increase in the frequency of personal injuries is likely to lead to demands to ease the ability of
victims to recover compensation. For example, the increased number of injuries among workers
resulting from the proliferation of railroads and factories led to the enactment of workers’
compensation.328 On the other hand, a greater frequency of personal injury claims also increases
the aggregate liability exposure of tortfeasors engaged in productive activities benefiting society.
This factor, pointing toward the tightening the requirements for liability, proved decisive when
the negligence regime replaced the ex-ante strict liability standard after the Industrial
Revolution.329
Similarly, an increase in the severity of the resulting injuries points in two different
directions regarding a change in liability standard. Society and its judges perceive victims with
more severe injuries, such as the smashing of bones following the Industrial Revolution, as more
in need of compensation than those that suffered less serious injuries resulting from older
technologies. Again, however, an increased severity of injuries likewise magnifies the liability
exposure of those perceived to be engaged in productive activities.

See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (suggesting that “if the probability be
called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B; liability depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by P; i.e.,
whether B[is] less than PL.”); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL
HARM § 3 (2010) (providing that the “primary factors to consider in ascertaining whether the person’s conduct lacks
reasonable care are the foreseeable likelihood that the person’s conduct will result in harm, the foreseeable severity
of any harm that may ensued, and the burden of precautions to eliminate or reduce the risk of harm.”).
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See supra note 292 and accompanying text.
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See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
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Any increase in the difficulty of proving the ex-ante requirements of liability resulting
from new technologies points in favor of lessening the difficulties of proof. Thus, this factor
typically points toward the adoption of either a common-law strict liability or no-fault
compensation system, in either event abrogating the plaintiff’s need to prove fault on the part of
the tortfeasor. The choice between the two is likely determined by the synergistic effect between
the difficulty-of-proof and severity-of-claims factors. With larger claims, such as cases
involving product-liability manufacturing defects, the difficulty in proving the claim may point
toward common-law strict liability. However, in claims where the ratio of the difficulty of
proving the claim is high compared to the severity of the claim, difficulty of proof points toward
a no-fault compensation system. This factor helps explain why social reformers and advocates
for workers generally favored the adoption of workers’ compensation, which eliminated the need
for the victim to prove that the employer both caused the accident and acted with fault.330
The whole point of new technologies is to increase social utility, so the social utility
factor generally points toward tightening the liability standards, that is, maintaining or
strengthening the requirements for proof of fault.
Each successive wave of society-wide technological change in American history ruptured
the fabric of the preexisting liability system. The mid-nineteenth century technological changes
spawned by the Industrial Revolution, most notably the development of railroads, appear to have
resulted in (1) an increased frequency of injuries that victims deemed worthy of attempts to seek
compensation, (2) a significant increase in the severity of the harms, (3) an increased difficulty
for victims proving their claims, and (4) the perception that the locomotives and other new
industrial machinery greatly contributed to social utility. By themselves, the first three factors

See WITT, supra note 32, at 170 (stating that the workers’ compensation system “sought to make employers liable
even in those cases in which conventional ways of thinking about causation in law would have assigned causal
responsibility elsewhere.”).
330
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might have led to a societal consensus that the rules governing liability should be loosened to
more readily enable recovery. However, courts, buttressed by the contemporary consensus that
technology was the key to progress,331 acted in a way suggesting they found that the social utility
of new technologies outweighed the need to compensate the increased number of victims
suffering substantially more severe injuries than in the preindustrial era. The weighing of the
four factors is inherently a political choice, and here Horwitz and Friedman are correct in
focusing on the shift in distributional consequences (from industrial tortfeasors to workers and
other victims) resulting from the change from a strict liability standard to a negligence regime.332
A few decades later, legislatures reevaluated these same four factors following the
development of the factory system and the proliferation of railroads and industrial machinery.333
In this instance, the (1) increased frequency of personal injuries resulting from these changes in
the economic system brought about by new technologies and (2) the difficulty of proving that the
employer acted with negligence, both pointed toward loosening the requirements for liability and
adopting a no-fault or strict liability system.
It might have been expected that employers would vigorously oppose the adoption of a
no-fault workers’ compensation system. However, many employers promoted the adoption of
workers’ compensation because of their fear that the fellow-servant rule, a key component of the
classical negligence regime,334 was about to collapse. If that had happened, employers’ liability
exposure within the common-law system, with the concomitant power of juries to award full
damages including difficult-to-control noneconomic damages,335 would have increased
dramatically. These employers convinced legislators of the need to limit the anticipated increase
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in their aggregate liability exposure so as to not threaten the social utility of their enterprises.336
The way to do this was to limit the severity of claims paid through the workers’ compensation
system, making the aggregate liability exposure more predictable and less than what employers
feared would happen if the fellow-servant rule was abolished.
Much like railroads and factories, the development of automobiles affected a change in
tort liability. Their widespread use led to an onslaught of accidents and a dramatic increase in
the frequency of injuries. Coupled with laws mandating requiring insurance coverage, the result
was a dramatic increase in the frequency of claims. The severity of these resulting claims varied
widely, but even with larger claims, the amount paid was almost always limited by insurance
policy limits. As a result, the severity of paid claims was modest. The difficulty of proving
negligence in any given case varied widely, but tended to be substantial when compared with the
amount of the expected recovery. This reality, combined with the high frequency of claims, led
to the adoption of formal no-fault plans in a minority of states. In most jurisdictions, however,
the negligence regime formally remained intact, but in fact insurance claims adjusters and
specialized plaintiffs’ attorneys routinized the settlement process, deemphasized the role of fault,
and assessed damages in a formulaic manner, all of which resemble a no-fault compensation
system more than they do the traditional tort litigation system.
Tracing how changes in liability standards for product manufacturers and suppliers
resulted from the development of the mass production/mass consumption society is more
difficult, because the changes took place in different decades, pointed in opposite directions, and
indeed were adopted by different branches of government. The mass production society
increased both the frequency and severity of personal injuries, but most importantly, also
increased the difficulty of a victim proving that the manufacturer or other distributor caused the
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harm and was at fault.337 Until the legislative and judicial backlash that began in the 1970s, the
difficulty-of-proof factor was the deciding factor in judicial opinions and resulted in significant
changes in the law from the negligence regime toward a strict-liability standard, including both
the abrogation of the privity limitation338 and the abolition of the need to prove the
manufacturer’s fault in cases involving manufacturing defects.339 By the 1980s, however, courts
and especially legislatures became persuaded that the increased liability exposure of product
manufacturers and distributors threatened their ongoing activities, which were perceived to be of
great social utility. Most courts functionally returned to a negligence-standard to govern design
defect and warning defect cases, and legislatures imposed a variety of limitations on the liability
exposure of product sellers including ones affecting either the frequency of successful claims340
or the severity of such claims.341

V. The Second American Technological Revolution—Autonomous Vehicles,
Robots, and Artificial Intelligence—and the Future of Liability Law
American society is in the midst of the second great technological revolution, one
characterized by autonomous vehicles, robots, networked medical devices, and artificial
intelligence. The Industrial Revolution replaced humans and animals as suppliers of physical
force with machines.342 In the new technological revolution, the contemporaneous decisionmaking that directs the physical force that is capable of inflicting personal injury is transferred
from human beings to machines.343

337

See supra note 292 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 283–287, and accompanying text.
339
See supra notes 296–298, and accompanying text.
340
See supra note 319 and accompanying text; see also Shepherd, supra note 283, at 269–71 (describing the
legislative “attack on products liability law” during the 1980s).
341
See supra note 320.
342
See supra notes 27–30, 78-81, and accompanying texts.
343
See David C. Vladeck, Machines Without Principals: Liability Rules and Artificial Intelligence, 89 WASH. L. REV.
117, 120 (2014) (“[T]he machine functions and makes decisions in ways that can be traced directly back to the design,
programming, and knowledge humans embedded in the machine.”); see also Bryant Walker Smith, Automated Driving
and Product Liability, 2017 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1, 47 (2017) (using a minor crash between a Google autonomous car
and a bus to illustrate the same point). However, Ryan Calo notes that “[r]obotics increasingly display emergent
behavior, meaning behavior that … cannot be anticipated in advance by operators.” RYAN CALO, CENTER FOR
338

63

Robots and other machines where human-decision making is, at a minimum, removed in
time from the operation of the machines, already cause deaths and injuries.344 For example,
according to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, robots caused at least thirtyeight American workplace deaths and injuries between 1984 and 2014.345 Both industrial and
surgical robots have caused injuries resulting in personal injury lawsuits against their
manufacturers.346 Autonomous vehicles, however, pose the greatest challenge to preexisting tort
law in the twenty-first century. For this reason, I focus here on autonomous vehicles and the
coming revolution in tort law that will result.
Autonomous vehicle technologies enable the vehicle itself to make the decisions
necessary for safe operation.347 Vehicles already on the market today include such automated
features as lane-departure warnings, cruise control that senses the presence of other vehicles and
adjusts accordingly, crash warning features, and automated parking technology.348 Fully
autonomous vehicles, currently under development and expected to be available to consumers on
a widespread basis by 2021349 will enable the driver to “cede full control of all safety-critical

TECHNOLOGY INNOVATION AT BROOKINGS, THE CASE FOR A FEDERAL ROBOTICS COMMISSION 5 (2014),
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functions under certain traffic or environmental conditions”350 or even “for an entire trip.”351
These vehicles use GPS-tracking and Lidar (laser-based sensing devices) to detect stationary and
other moving objects in all directions.352 In addition, major car manufacturers are developing
vehicle-to-vehicle and vehicle-to-infrastructure technologies that will, for example, enable
autonomous vehicles to communicate with one another.353
If everyone owned and operated an autonomous vehicle, the frequency of personal
injuries resulting from auto accidents would be very substantially reduced, probably by ninety
percent or more.354 In the decades before such full-market penetration, the reduction in the
frequency of personal injury accidents, while still substantial, will be much less.355 In contrast,
the severity of injuries resulting from accidents involving autonomous vehicles is likely to be
much greater than those currently caused by automobiles, because the autonomous vehicles are
projected to be traveling at much greater speeds and in closer proximity to one another.356 Even
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if the mean severity of claims increases, however, the aggregate cost of personal injuries
resulting from accidents involving autonomous vehicles is expected to be considerably less than
the current costs of automobile accidents because of the sizable decrease in the frequency of
accidents.357
The substitution of autonomous vehicles for current automobiles and trucks will
dramatically shift the distribution of which parties are legally liable for personal injuries
resulting from accidents and hence which parties will pay for such liability, presumably through
higher insurance premiums. Automobile drivers and owners, and their insurers, currently pay the
bulk of the costs of personal injuries resulting from accidents.358 Drivers are in control of their
vehicles, and injured parties must prove that they were negligent to recover.359 In contrast, with
autonomous vehicles, the driver is not in control and cannot be held liable for negligence, except
perhaps for unreasonably deciding to take control of a partially autonomous vehicle360 or for
unreasonably failing to maintain an autonomous vehicle. Instead, the bulk of the liability will
fall on the manufacturers of autonomous vehicles colliding with one another361 or the parties
responsible for maintaining and mapping the surrounding infrastructure for autonomous vehicles,
including assuring the presence of clear lane markings, uniform road markings and signs, and the
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external hardware and software necessary for vehicle-to-vehicle communications.362 States and
localities and their contractors will be responsible for this infrastructure.363
It will probably be much more difficult for the plaintiff injured in an accident involving
autonomous vehicles than it is for today’s victim of an automobile accident to prove which party
or parties “caused the accident” and whether they were at fault.364 The evidence likely will
consist of “lines of code” rather than “broken mechanical parts”365 and require expert testimony.
Additionally, unless the law changes, the injured victim will need to prove that a particular
defendant engaged in tortious conduct that was a factual cause of the injury.366 Proving factual
causation is usually fairly easy in today’s routine automobile accident, but once autonomousvehicle-to-autonomous-vehicle accidents become the norm, investigators and jurors will be
required to disentangle the electronic impulses from two or more vehicles, the response or lack
of response from the infrastructure coordinating communications among vehicles, and perhaps
the acts or omissions of drivers who took control of their vehicles unwisely or who failed to do
so, in order to establish which parties were factual causes of the accident.367 If there is a
significant possibility that one of the vehicles malfunctioned, the manufacturers of component
parts, including software designers, join those whose actions or omissions may have contributed
to the accident.
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Determining which parties’ conduct may have been factual causes of the accident only
brings the victim of an accident part way to the goal of proving liability, which also requires
proof of facts establishing tortious conduct. Here, the liability of drivers368 and, under current
law, software engineers,369 will both require proof of negligence. The manufacturers of the
autonomous vehicles and their component parts (excluding software) might be held liable on a
strict liability basis, but even there, most jurisdictions require that a plaintiff prove the existence
of a design defect through the negligence-like risk-utility test to hold the manufacturer liable.370
A party whose conduct is both tortious and a cause of the accident involving autonomous
vehicles might be held liable in either of two ways depending on how the technology of
autonomous vehicles develops. In an accident with autonomous vehicles employing vehicle-tovehicle communication, the electronic “paper trail” following an accident might reveal whether it
was one of the autonomous vehicles, its driver, or the infrastructure that malfunctioned.371 In the
absence of such devices, even if the plaintiff cannot prove which party(ies) engaged in tortious
conduct contributing to the accident, some courts might find all parties jointly and severally
liable under the doctrine of alternative liability.372
As noted previously,373 an important consequence of the replacement of driver-operated
vehicles with autonomous vehicles is likely to be a shift in legal liability for the bulk of accident
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costs from drivers to vehicle-manufacturers. Obviously, this will have significant implications
for liability insurance. Automobile insurance premiums will plummet because legal liability for
most of the accident costs now covered by liability and collision insurance will be transferred to
vehicle manufacturers.374 Once a manufacturer has sold a vehicle, however, there probably is no
practical way for the manufacturer to be reimbursed for its ongoing, annual insurance premiums
covering the expected liability. Hence, the distribution of autonomous vehicles from
manufacturers to consumers probably will be altered in one or more of several ways. First, if the
autonomous vehicle is sold to an individual driver, the upfront purchase price will include the
present discounted value of the amounts the manufacturer expects to spend during the useful life
of the autonomous vehicle on accident costs, through either insurance premiums or selfinsurance.375 Second, the manufacturer’s liability for the costs of accidents involving
autonomous vehicles makes it more likely that the vehicles will be leased, rather than sold, and
that annual lease payments will include the manufacturer’s expected liability costs.376 Third,
today’s norm of privately-owned automobiles may be replaced with a system in which
ridesharing businesses such as Uber or Lyft own the vast majority of autonomous vehicles and
provide transportation for private parties on an individual-ride basis.377 The recent proliferation
of partnerships among ridesharing businesses, automobile manufacturers, and software
corporations is no coincidence.378
Let us now apply the four factors considered in Part IV to accidents involving
autonomous vehicles:
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(1) The frequency of accidents resulting from the proliferation of autonomous vehicles
will be dramatically decreased from the current frequency of automobile accidents.379
(2) The severity of the remaining accidents likely will be greater than those resulting
from current automobile accidents.380
However, the aggregate liability exposure (frequency times severity) will still be
considerably less than under the current system.381
(3) The difficulty of proving liability will depend on whether autonomous vehicle
manufacturers include event data recorders within the vehicles.382 If they do, the
difficulty of proving liability may not be substantially greater than under the current
automobile system, but proof of liability will still require technical expertise. If event
data recorders are not included, proving liability, both causation and negligence, will
be substantially more difficult than under the current system.
(4) The social utility of the proliferation of autonomous vehicles is great.383 Much of this
increased social utility results from the dramatic decline in the frequency of accidents,
but other social benefits will include the ability of children and disabled persons to
travel in such vehicles without an able-bodied adult present, greater density of traffic
(thus requiring fewer roads and travel lanes), and greater convenience.
The difficulties of proving that any particular party within the autonomous vehicle
system, including the manufacturers of the vehicles, operators of the infrastructure, software
engineers, or drivers of the vehicles, caused an accident and engaged in tortious conduct (e.g.,
the product was defective) suggest some form of collective liability for the purpose of
compensating personal injury victims.384 Manufacturers of autonomous vehicles and those
responsible for designing, building, and maintaining the infrastructure would be assessed to
provide the compensation pool from which injured victims will be compensated. Witt notes that
workers’ compensation is really a system that dispenses with proof of factual causation as well
as fault,385 and the same principle would apply here.
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The principal distinction between a strict liability and a no-fault system is whether the
liability system is administered by common law courts in which juries typically determine
damages or no-fault administrative agencies where damages are limited and typically do not
include compensation for noneconomic damages. As was the case during the nineteenth century,
the expected high social utility of autonomous vehicles is relevant to the choice between a
common-law strict liability approach and a no-fault compensation system. Society may
legitimately decide that because of the extremely significant overall improvement in safety
resulting from autonomous vehicles and other positive aspects of autonomous vehicles,386 the
development of the autonomous-vehicle technology should be subsidized. The goal of using the
liability system to subsidize a safer, beneficial transportation system suggests that the task of
assessing the costs of accidents be withdrawn from common law courts and juries and transferred
to administrative agencies. Additionally, this change may be justified because jurors’
widespread skepticism about complex technologies and resentment toward corporations that
promote such technologies might result in unwarranted findings of liability and excessive
damages.387
There are contrary arguments that suggest that common law liability should apply to
autonomous vehicle accidents.388 Some manufacturers of autonomous vehicles and the
accompanying infrastructure may be less careful in the design and implementation of the
autonomous vehicle system than others, and the limitations on damages present in no-fault
compensation systems reduce the incentives to minimize losses. Proponents of no-fault liability
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would rely on regulatory agencies and market pressures to provide the incentives to minimize
accidents, but this has not always proven to be a safe assumption.389
To be effective, a no-fault liability system for autonomous vehicles would require
congressional enactment. Common law courts could not adopt any system that limited the
damages received by victims. Any attempt by a state legislature to enact a no-fault
compensation system would not be effective in creating a subsidy to encourage the development
of an autonomous-vehicle network. Manufacturers operate in a national marketplace and their
vehicles travel across state borders, subjecting manufacturers to liability in states that have not
enacted no-fault compensation systems.390 During the past half-century, a well-organized
plaintiff’s bar vigorously fought the adoption of no-fault compensation systems in virtually all
contexts in which they were proposed.391 Lawsuits arising from automobile accidents are the
bread-and-butter of the vast majority of plaintiffs’ counsel,392 and thus it is unlikely that their
opposition would be anything other than fierce.
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Legal historians and tort scholars have failed to pay sufficient attention to the primary
role played by technological change in the law governing compensation for personal injuries.
The first great transformation of American tort law, the adoption of the negligence regime,
occurred during the mid-nineteenth century when courts for the first time faced numerous claims
from victims of personal injuries caused by post-Industrial Revolution machinery, particularly
railroads.393
The second major set of changes in American accident compensation law, which I regard
as delayed aftershocks of the Industrial Revolution, began when most workplace injuries were
removed from the common law tort system and handled within the separate workers’
compensation system.394 Once again, the impacts of technology on the economy, here the
development of the factory system and the proliferation of railroads and other industrial
machinery, contributed to the change.395 Within decades, the proliferation of the automobile
culture and the mass injuries it produced resulted in the formal enactment of workers’compensation-type no-fault systems in a minority of states. Moreover, in most states, the
negligence regime remained nominally intact, but now functioned more like a no-fault system
than the traditional negligence regime.396 Finally, during the 1960s and 1970s, the mass
consumer society appeared to result in another important change in American tort law, the
adoption of strict products liability.397 Over the longer term, however, this change in the law
turned out to be more apparent than real.398
From this history, in this Article I derive a descriptive model for analyzing and predicting
what changes in accident compensation law will result from the adoption of new technologies.
The model suggests that changes in tort law will follow from technology-caused changes in the
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following four variables: (1) the frequency of accident injuries resulting from the new
technology, (2) the severity of injury resulting from the technological innovations, (3) the
difficulty facing the claimant in proving the prerequisites of liability, and (4) the social utility of
the new technology.
Society is now in the early phases of a technological revolution that will rival the
Industrial Revolution in importance, one involving robots, artificial intelligence, and, most
importantly, autonomous vehicles.399 During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, postIndustrial-Revolution machines replaced the power and force previously supplied by human
beings and horses. Now machines are replacing the decision-making previously supplied by
humans.400
Application of the model’s factors to autonomous vehicles suggests the adoption of either
a no-fault system or a strict, collective liability standard within the common law that requires
proof of neither fault nor individual causation as a requirement of liability. The choice between
these two alternatives should be made on the basis of two factors: (1) the extent to which we trust
administrative regulation to assure an adequate level of attention to safety consideration in the
development of an autonomous vehicle system, and (2) the need to subsidize the development of
the autonomous vehicle system that offers great positive social utility. Regardless of the choice,
the next technology-inspired revolution in American tort law looms on the horizon.
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